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# **Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept**



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**PREFACE**

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**Why the concepts?**

4 The future Joint Force will operate in a complex and uncertain global security  
5 environment in which adversaries seek to apply asymmetric threats to our perceived  
6 vulnerabilities. International organizations, nation states, rogue states, and terrorist  
7 organizations are prominent actors in this environment. Taken together, these have  
8 led to a shift in the characteristics of joint warfare and crisis resolution. By extension,  
9 the Joint Force’s role in this security environment has changed.

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**What the concepts are**

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The Range of Military Operations (ROMO) identifies 43 activities for which the Joint Force must prepare. The ROMO reflects this changed security environment and is the foundation for the development of Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) – a strategic guidance document that identifies the future capabilities and modes of operation needed to realize the Chairman’s vision of achieving Full Spectrum Dominance by the Joint Force. JOpsC serves two roles. First, the JOpsC is a concept paper that describes how the Joint Force is envisioned to operate in the next 15-20 years. Second, the JOpsC is the overarching concept for a new family of joint concepts that describes the attributes and capabilities that tomorrow’s Joint Force requires. JOpsC helps guide the development of Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Experimentation, all designed to assist in the development of enhanced joint military capabilities needed to protect and advance U.S. interests.

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**What the concepts do**

28 This new family of joint concepts will play a central role in the capabilities-based  
29 methodology for Joint Force development. This concept paper is an important  
30 extension of that effort. As you read and use this concept paper, it is important to  
31 understand its role in helping guide the Joint Force and enhancing joint warfighting  
32 capabilities – two of the Chairman’s key strategic priorities.

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**Disclaimer**

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This document requires Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval to proceed into assessment by joint experimentation. A concept may, after further development, experimentation, assessment and refinement, lead to an accepted way of doing something. It is only after an accepted concept has been validated and approved, with reasonable confidence, that it provides the basis for force planning and doctrine development. The views expressed in this document do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

*“To be prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote peace.”*  
*George Washington*

**Purpose and Scope**

U.S. military forces have always played an important deterrent role throughout our country’s history. During the Cold War, deterrence expanded to become the military centerpiece of a successful grand strategy (containment) aimed at countering Soviet expansion. The opening years of the 21st Century, however, present many new and different challenges for our military deterrence efforts. As stated by the President, “Deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations . . . Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.”<sup>1</sup>

Deterrence must remain a vibrant tool in support of our national leadership. Deterrence must now work in concert with the defense policy goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading future military competition, and decisively defeating any adversary. Additionally, deterrence efforts must accommodate a reinvigorated homeland security posture and evolve with emerging concepts of major combat and stability operations to protect and further U.S. security interests.

These new challenges require a new concept for “waging” deterrence paired with revised joint force capabilities that together provide the President a wider range of military deterrent options. Strategic deterrence requires a national deterrence strategy that integrates and brings to bear all elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The military component of that strategy involves strategic deterrence operations conducted in accordance with the joint operating concept presented here.

This Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD JOC) describes how Joint Force Commander (JFC)(s) will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force to contribute to a strategic deterrence strategy set forth by national leadership through 2015. This in turn will help guide the transformation of the joint force. It will provide the basis for the development

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Strategy, Sep 02, p. 15.

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1 of integrated architectures and experimentation approaches that enable both  
2 analysis of future Joint Strategic Deterrence capabilities and further concept  
3 development.

### 4 Definition

5 Strategic Deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary aggression or  
6 coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national  
7 survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous  
8 courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

9  
10 Enduring U.S. vital interests include: Maintaining the sovereignty of U.S.  
11 territory; preventing mass casualties at home and abroad; providing critical  
12 infrastructure protection (CIP) for our essential U.S. and international  
13 infrastructures (energy, telecommunications, water, essential services, etc.)  
14 that support our basic standard of living and economic viability; promoting  
15 democracy and free trade, and supporting the defense of U.S. allies. Because  
16 of the uncertain future security environment, specific vital interests may arise  
17 that are identified by senior national leadership. Strategic deterrence must be  
18 sufficiently robust and flexible to accommodate these changes if and when they  
19 occur. The broad view of strategic deterrence taken in this concept allows for  
20 this potential future expansion. The SD JOC also hedges against uncertainty  
21 by adopting a portfolio approach towards implementation.

22

### 23 The Military Problem: Today to 2015

24 The SD JOC addresses both near-term (today to 2010) and longer-term (2010  
25 to 2015) international security environments. In the near-term, JFCs will be  
26 called on to pursue strategic deterrence objectives vis-à-vis both nation-states  
27 and non-state actors that possess a broad range of capabilities. Because of  
28 uncertainty regarding who, where, and when we might fight (and over what  
29 issues), JFCs will face a paradigm shift from optimized planning against  
30 specific adversaries to planning designed to address a wider spectrum of  
31 contingencies. Deterrence of both initial and escalatory use of weapons of  
32 mass destruction is especially important, as it will enable the JFC to fully  
33 leverage our advantages in conventional combined-arms operations. This  
34 includes deterring the transfer of WMD capabilities (i.e., counterproliferation) to  
35 terrorists determined to harm the U.S. and its interests.

36 Regardless of the shape of the post-2010 environment, strategic deterrence  
37 must continue to stabilize the global landscape by providing a permissive  
38 environment for pursuing constructive U.S. policy goals worldwide.<sup>2</sup> Beyond

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<sup>2</sup> Conceptually, the aim of deterrence is to preserve a status quo condition. By itself, deterrence cannot achieve positive aims. However, successful deterrence sets conditions for other, positivist actions to improve conditions and achieve desired endstates.

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1 2010 our strategic deterrence success will depend in large part on how well we  
2 address key near and long(er)-term challenges:

3 Multiple, Less Well Understood Adversaries: For the foreseeable future, the  
4 United States will face an array of potential adversaries whose political,  
5 cultural, and idiosyncratic differences will complicate our efforts both to  
6 understand and to influence their perceptions for deterrent purposes. The  
7 increased potential for mutual miscalculation that can result must be taken  
8 into account.

9 Widely Varying Risk-Taking Propensity: A broad array of potential adversaries  
10 means that strategic deterrence must handle a similarly broad array of  
11 adversary risk-taking propensities. An adversary's risk-taking behavior can  
12 profoundly influence both his perception of a situation and the best means of  
13 influencing those perceptions.

14  
15 Asymmetry of Stake vs. Power: Despite the fact the United States is almost  
16 certain to be more powerful than its adversaries in future strategic deterrence  
17 scenarios, some adversaries may perceive their stake in the outcome of the  
18 crisis/conflict to be great enough to disregard U.S. military superiority. This  
19 can undermine the effectiveness of strategic deterrence. The U.S. must  
20 address this challenge by providing the means of overcoming potential  
21 imbalances of stake and power that bolster the credibility of U.S. strategic  
22 deterrence efforts.

23  
24 Technological Vulnerabilities of U.S. Society and Forces: Both the U.S.  
25 economy and U.S. military forces will use advanced technologies to enhance  
26 their competitive advantages. While this technological superiority yields  
27 tremendous capabilities, it also creates potential vulnerabilities that  
28 adversaries might exploit. Planners must address U.S. vulnerabilities, identify  
29 ways of eliminating them where feasible, and compensate for them when  
30 necessary.

31

### 32 **Synopsis of the Central Idea: Ends, Ways, and Means**

33 The central idea of the SD JOC is to exercise decisive influence over a potential  
34 adversary's strategic deterrence Center of Gravity: the decision-making  
35 calculus of key adversary decision-makers. The SD JOC outlines the "ways"  
36 and "means" by which the "end" of strategic deterrence is achieved through  
37 decisive influence over adversary decision-making.

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1  
2 An adversary’s strategic deterrence decision calculus contains three primary  
3 elements:<sup>3</sup>  
4

- 5 • Adversary perception of the benefits of a course of action
- 6 • Adversary perception of the costs of a course of action
- 7 • Adversary perception of the consequences of restraint (i.e., what will  
8 happen to them if they do not take the course of action)  
9

10 The “ways” listed below are the tools for implementing effective strategic  
11 deterrence. Success in these three areas implemented through joint military  
12 operations and activities contribute to the “end” of strategic deterrence by  
13 affecting the adversary’s decision calculus elements:  
14

- 15 • Denying Benefits
- 16 • Imposing Costs
- 17 • Inducing Adversary Restraint  
18

19 Military strategic deterrence efforts must integrate all three “ways” across a  
20 variety of adversaries and deterrence objectives. These objectives may change  
21 over time and must be synchronized with the application of the other  
22 instruments of national power (economic, informational, diplomatic). Strategic  
23 deterrence “ways” are not “either/or” propositions. Rather, when properly  
24 leveraged they are mutually reinforcing and synergistic. Because the threats in  
25 2015 will be increasingly transnational and/or transregional, these military  
26 strategic deterrence efforts may involve actions by multiple JFCs worldwide.  
27

28 The specific military “means” required to credibly deny benefits, impose costs,  
29 and induce adversary restraint will vary significantly from adversary to  
30 adversary, and situation to situation. These capabilities are widely spread  
31 across the Joint Force and are much broader and encompassing than those  
32 forces previously associated with implementing our Cold War-era strategic  
33 deterrence strategy. Some aspects of these military means may contribute  
34 more directly to warfighting (i.e., “defeat”) than deterrence. However, it is  
35 possible to identify key capabilities (and deterrence-related attributes of those  
36 capabilities) that must be planned for regardless of their warfighting utility.  
37

38 The military “means” of the SD JOC fall into two categories: those that directly  
39 and decisively influence an adversary’s decision calculus, and those that  
40 enable such decisive influence.  
41

42 Enabling “means” include:

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<sup>3</sup> This concept expands upon the Strategic Deterrence Analytical Framework Model presented in the 2002 Strategic Deterrence JWCA Final Report. For additional detail, reference Nagy, Sievers, Weaver, et al., “Understanding Deterrence – A Seesaw Model” (unpublished, 2003).

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- Global Situational Awareness
- Command and Control
- Overseas Presence
- Allied/coalition Military Cooperation and Integration

Direct “means” include:

- Force Projection
- Nuclear Strike Capabilities
- Active and Passive Defenses
- Global Strike
- Strategic Deterrence Information Operations
- Inducement Operations
- Space Control

The SD JOC describes how each of these “means” (capabilities and attributes) contributes to the “ways” of achieving the strategic deterrence “end”. It identifies how the joint force attributes identified in Joint Operations Concepts impact these capabilities. Additionally, the SD JOC calls out those attributes that are unique to strategic deterrence and successful implementation of this joint operating concept. Thus, each capability requirement identified is tied directly back to its role in joint strategic deterrence operations as envisioned in the SD JOC.

**Application**

The SD JOC outlines the “ways” and “means” necessary to achieve the “end” of strategic deterrence. It focuses strategic deterrence on the appropriate Center of Gravity: the adversary’s decision calculus. It describes how an adversary’s decision-making can be decisively influenced through denying benefits, imposing costs, and inducing adversary restraint. It identifies those capabilities and associated attributes required to exercise such decisive influence. Further, it proposes a means of evaluating the effectiveness of alternative strategic deterrence choices, making future experimentation and further concept development possible.



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**DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

**STATEMENT OF PURPOSE**

*Today's threats are far more diverse and less predictable than those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence.*

*National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.*

**Introduction.** In the current and future security environment, strategic deterrence must address a broader range of potential adversaries and situations than in any previous era of U.S. history. Future deterrent success will be heavily influenced by how potential adversaries perceive U.S. national will and resolve in the face of severe threats to ourselves and our allies. Thus, strategic deterrence requires a national deterrence strategy that integrates and brings to bear all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. The military component of that strategy involves strategic deterrence operations conducted in accordance with the Joint Operating Concept presented here. Such strategic deterrence operations must now work in concert with a reinvigorated homeland security posture and continuously evolving concepts of major combat and stability operations. These new strategic deterrence challenges require revised joint force capabilities that provide the President with a wider range of timely military options to discourage aggression or any form of military coercion against the United States or its vital interests.

**Strategic Deterrence:<sup>4</sup> The prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.**

U.S. vital interests include: maintaining the sovereignty of U.S. territory; preserving basic political and societal integrity within the U.S; preventing mass

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<sup>4</sup> "Strategic" Deterrence is not currently defined in JP 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Deterrence is defined as "The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." The word "strategic" is not currently defined in JP 1-02 as a standalone modifier. This joint operating concept intends to meaningfully deepen the Joint Force understanding of deterrence generally (as a national strategy) and of DoD military contributions to strategic deterrence in particular.

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1 casualties among the U.S. population; securing critical U.S. and international  
2 infrastructures (energy, telecommunications, water, essential services, etc.)  
3 that support our basic standard of living and economic viability; and  
4 supporting the defense of U.S. allies. Because of the uncertain future security  
5 environment, additional vital interests may arise that are identified by senior  
6 national leadership. Strategic deterrence must be sufficiently robust and  
7 flexible to accommodate these changes if and when they occur. Flexibility in  
8 our strategic deterrence construct also hedges against the possibility that an  
9 adversary might incorrectly perceive their actions to be “below the radarscope”  
10 of U.S. resolve and response.

11  
12 The ultimate purpose of the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept  
13 (JOC) is to help guide the transformation of the joint force. This concept will  
14 generate thought and discussion about new methods for waging strategic  
15 deterrence in response to current and emerging military threats. This concept  
16 will also provide the basis for military experiments and exercises. If validated,  
17 this joint operating concept will influence subsequent concept development and  
18 will lead to capability development efforts that could result in doctrine,  
19 organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and  
20 facilities (DOTMLPF) changes. There are a number of capabilities and  
21 attributes derived from this joint operating concept unique to strategic  
22 deterrence.

23  
24 In addition, because successful strategic deterrence requires many of the same  
25 credible capabilities needed to conduct military operations in accordance with  
26 other joint operating concepts--Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations,  
27 Homeland Security, and eventually others, there is considerable overlap of  
28 capabilities and attributes with all of them.<sup>5</sup> This joint operating concept  
29 highlights those overlaps that are critical to strategic deterrence, and illustrates  
30 how they are relevant to influencing an adversary’s decision-making regarding  
31 possible attacks that would threaten U.S. vital interests. This concept also  
32 highlights functional capabilities and attributes that are uniquely required for  
33 strategic deterrence to conduct operations in support of defense policy goals  
34 and national objectives.

35

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<sup>5</sup> Not all activities and functions conducted by the Joint Force support strategic deterrence. Some Joint Force capabilities exist that benefit the security of the U.S. through their warfighting application but may conflict with the strategic deterrence methods outlined herein. Additionally, some capabilities have complementary characteristics that support both deterrence and warfighting aims. Capabilities common to multiple joint operating concepts are noted throughout this document.

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1  
2 **TIME FRAME, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RISKS**  
3

4 **Time Frame.**

5  
6 The intended timeframe covered by this Strategic Deterrence JOC is 2015,  
7 including actions required between current-day through 2015 to meet the  
8 desired endstate.<sup>6</sup>  
9

10 **Assumptions.**

- 11
- 12 • Nearly all adversary decision-makers will act in accordance with the logic  
13 of rational self-interest. Self-interest, by definition, is viewed from the  
14 respective adversary’s cultural, religious, ideological, and personal  
15 perspective, often contrary to U.S. or western norms. For example, the  
16 perceived value of human life varies among cultures, influence groups,  
17 and organizations. Rewards for the elimination of those deemed  
18 “unworthy” (for cultural, religious, or ideological reasons) may motivate  
19 actions contrary to U.S. interests. Rational self-interest may involve  
20 internal organizational factors as well as external considerations.
  - 21 • Because the perceptions and capabilities of potential adversaries varies,  
22 the specific military “means” required to credibly deny benefits, impose  
23 costs, and induce adversary restraint may vary significantly from  
24 adversary to adversary, and situation to situation.
  - 25 • Some rational actors (both state and non-state) will be extremely difficult  
26 to deter, given their worldview and the resulting content of their decision-  
27 making calculus. Policy and related military options other than strategic  
28 deterrence will be required to deal with such rational but difficult to deter  
29 adversaries in the event strategic deterrence fails.
  - 30 • Irrational actors are extremely rare. They may not be influenced by  
31 deterrence efforts and will require other methods to prevent or counter  
32 their actions. The capabilities required for successful strategic  
33 deterrence may support these other methods.
  - 34 • Third parties, both state and non-state actors, will learn lessons from  
35 deterrence successes and failures over time. These “lessons learned”  
36 may profoundly affect future U.S. strategic deterrence success.

37  
38 **Risks.**

- 39
- 40 • Strategic deterrence effectiveness is critically dependent on adversary  
41 perceptions of U.S. national will and political resolve. Events,  
42 circumstances, or decisions outside the purview of DOD could  
43 undermine the effectiveness of the joint operating concept.

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<sup>6</sup> Although acquisition of some complex systems may not be feasible before 2015, many of the non-materiel organizing concepts discussed in this paper could be implemented readily.

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- 1 • Continued reliance on existing strategic deterrence systems, policies, and  
2 procedures without consideration of the current and future security  
3 environment could result in the U.S. being self-deterred. The lessons  
4 learned during Cold War-era strategic deterrence operations will not be  
5 universally applicable in the 2015 timeframe and may, in fact, foster  
6 “negative training” within the joint force if not repudiated.
- 7 • A strategic deterrence posture that relies solely on the threat of  
8 retaliation may artificially constrain the range of available deterrent  
9 options. There exists a wide range of other U.S. military actions and  
10 activities that can contribute to decisive influence over an adversary’s  
11 decision-making (e.g., information operations, active and passive  
12 defense, etc.). In fact in some cases, a U.S. retaliatory response may be  
13 exactly the result a potential adversary is counting on (e.g., an  
14 adversary’s martyrdom that ultimately furthers their cause elsewhere).
- 15 • Reliance on overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority (specifically, the  
16 ability to defeat adversaries through major combat operations) may not  
17 by itself provide effective strategic deterrence.
- 18 • U.S. ability to rapidly respond to adversary technological breakthroughs  
19 could atrophy from inadequate investment in innovative DOD and  
20 industrial research and development capabilities.
- 21 • U.S. overreliance on technology, if not balanced by a mature  
22 understanding of the fundamental human nature of war could become  
23 an “Achilles’ Heel”.
- 24 • Failure to expand strategic deterrence efforts to explicitly consider the  
25 defense policy goals of assurance and dissuasion could risk unilateral  
26 action by allies and friends to preserve their interests. Additionally, this  
27 could result in lost opportunities to influence an adversary’s decision  
28 making prior to the point of crisis.
- 29 • Piecemeal development and application of military strategic deterrence  
30 efforts that fail to incorporate all instruments of national power may  
31 produce deterrence gaps with regard to trans-regional concerns and  
32 failed states, (e.g., ungoverned spaces and rogue states) where non-state  
33 actors might operate with impunity.
- 34 • Inadequate understanding of adversary perceptions and decision-making  
35 processes may promote mirror imaging on the part of the U.S., and lead  
36 to incorrect U.S. deterrent decisions.
- 37 • The U.S. could miscalculate regarding an adversary’s reaction to our  
38 policies and actions, in spite of every effort to avoid such an outcome.
- 39 • U.S. may be unable to determine what specific strategic deterrence  
40 actions or combination of actions deterred an adversary from a course of  
41 action that threatened U.S. vital interests, or even whether adversary  
42 restraint indicated deterrence success. This could hamper efforts to  
43 draw important “lessons learned” needed to enhance strategic deterrence  
44 operations in the future.

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- Failure to recognize that strategic deterrence is dynamic could result in the U.S. adopting a static strategic deterrence posture in peacetime, modifying that posture only in response to severe crisis. Doing so would forgo a broad range of peacetime opportunities to influence potential adversaries' decision-making and shape the "deterrence battlefield", and could result in deterrence failure.

## DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM

### Political/Military Environment.

The military problem that the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept must address could change profoundly over the 2003-2015 timeframe. To reflect this potential for significant change, addressed in detail in various DOD documents including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the following description of the political-military environment divides this timeframe into two periods. Significant change is not anticipated in the near-term period (present day-2010), but such change is possible in the mid-term period (2010-2015). The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept is explicitly designed to be effective across both periods, regardless of the potential for profound political-military uncertainty in the mid-term.

**Near-term (present day-2010).** The near-term global political-military environment (through 2010) is a complex web of regional, cultural, and political competitions and conflicts, marked by U.S. military preeminence. In this time frame no single state will be capable of engaging in a comprehensive, global political-military competition with the United States. However, numerous threats to U.S. vital interests will persist through 2010, making the near-term political-military environment increasingly convoluted in terms of both the number of potential state and non-state adversaries and their interrelationships.

The potential remains for serious interstate conflict that could threaten U.S. vital interests in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast and East Asia. These interstate conflicts, should they occur, could involve one or more countries armed with nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, and pose threats to the survival of U.S. Allies and friends. During this period, the United States faces a multifaceted and interrelated international security environment in which strategic deterrence of nation-state threats plays an important, but not preeminent, role in U.S. national security policy. However, deterrence of both the initial and intra-war escalatory use of weapons of mass destruction will remain important since it enables the joint force to fully leverage our preeminence in large-scale, combined-arms operations.

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1 The near-term security environment will also be marked by threats to U.S. vital  
2 interests posed by a variety of non-state actors, primarily in the form of  
3 transnational terrorism. The ongoing Global War on Terrorism is focused, first  
4 and foremost, on defeating Al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations.  
5 Strategic deterrence has two roles in this effort: First, our deterrence efforts  
6 seek to deter additional terrorist organizations from joining forces with Al  
7 Qaeda in attacking U.S. vital interests; second, we seek to deter other nation-  
8 states from arming, aiding, or providing sanctuary to Al Qaeda and other  
9 transnational terrorist groups. In this regard, deterring the transfer of  
10 weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies/know-how to  
11 terrorists is of acute concern.

12  
13 In this near-term period, crisis and conflict will primarily take the form of  
14 asymmetric struggles characterized by adversary attempts to exploit niche  
15 advantages against an otherwise dominant U.S. military. Because of  
16 uncertainty regarding who, where, and over which issues we might fight, JFCs  
17 will face a paradigm shift from optimized planning against well known, specific  
18 adversaries to more adaptive, capabilities-based planning, explicitly designed to  
19 cope with a wider spectrum of contingencies. Continued proliferation of WMD  
20 and associated delivery means, as well as the emergence of additional actors  
21 who are capable and willing to conduct other forms of asymmetric operations  
22 (e.g., commercial/private aircraft, maritime vessels, and other non-traditional  
23 weapons), underscore the need of U.S. joint forces to continue improving  
24 capabilities for power projection and homeland defense.

25  
26 **Mid-Term (2010-2015).** In the mid-term period, it is exceedingly difficult to  
27 predict the nature and shape of the global political-military or economic  
28 environments. Foreseeing the shape of longer-term international political  
29 alignments and power relationships is challenging. For example, the political-  
30 military environment of 1930 compared to 1950 (or 1980 to 2000) illustrates  
31 how radically the global security situation can change. Accurate projection of  
32 longer-term economic developments is equally difficult, and no less important,  
33 as economic strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities powerfully shape  
34 international power balances and political relationships. For example, it is  
35 unclear how energy needs and access to water rights will impact the global  
36 economy in the 2010-2015 timeframe. Increasing demand for limited  
37 resources due to rapid economic development in major states such as China  
38 and India could worsen future security problems, creating international  
39 tensions that do not exist today. Alternatively, revolutionary advances in  
40 energy or desalinization technologies could make competition for resources a  
41 far less prominent source of international tension than it is today.

42  
43 These difficulties in making accurate longer-term political and economic  
44 projections are exacerbated in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century by accelerating technological  
45 advancement capable of changing a nation's military capabilities or potential  
46 nearly overnight. The possibility for anomalous events or profound shocks to

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1 the international system may dramatically shift the relative power or strategic  
2 outlook of major actors. China could become a near-peer competitor. The  
3 long-term course of the Global War on Terrorism and the Arab-Israeli dispute  
4 will fundamentally shape the future of U.S. relations with the Islamic world.  
5 Increasing individual empowerment and association with transnational or  
6 nongovernmental interest groups may weaken traditional nation-state  
7 relationships and interactions.

8  
9 While mid-term global political and economic trends are difficult to discern,  
10 analysis of mid-term capability trends is more manageable. These trends  
11 suggest we will face a world with one to three additional nuclear-capable  
12 states, and a substantial number of potential adversaries with WMD and  
13 missile delivery capabilities. Commercially available information and cyber  
14 services (many enabled through space systems) will provide an element of  
15 global reach for actors once limited to only exerting regional influence.

16  
17 Successful near-term strategic deterrence may result in adversaries adopting  
18 new strategies based on lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism and  
19 other recent and future U.S. military operations. These adversaries will  
20 continue to operate on the periphery of an asymmetric battleground narrowed  
21 significantly by an increasingly persistent and intrusive U.S. intelligence  
22 capability. Adversary anti-access and area denial strategies will proliferate.  
23 Failed states may increasingly serve as havens for training camps and bases of  
24 operations for hostile non-state actors. Increasingly effective U.S. ballistic  
25 missile defenses may force shifts in preferred adversary WMD delivery  
26 mechanisms. These adapted capabilities may include cruise missile or  
27 unconventional delivery systems. The Homeland Security JOC addresses these  
28 threats that the U.S. may face in the future.

29  
30 The proliferation of commercial dual-use technology, including the addition of  
31 satellite-assisted precision-guided weapons, will make this adaptation more  
32 feasible for a wider variety of potential adversaries. The emergence of Weapons  
33 of Mass Effect (WME)<sup>7</sup> will leverage advanced technologies such as computer  
34 network attack or directed energy weapons to achieve objectives once  
35 attainable only via the use of WMD. Future “arms” races will focus on  
36 predicting the emergence of (and providing integrated plans for thwarting) next  
37 generation adversary capabilities. These capabilities may not be “military” in  
38 the traditional sense, but they will be enabled through the prevalence of  
39 Information Age technologies, organizations, and actors in societies of all levels  
40 of technological sophistication. Strategic deterrence must continue to stabilize  
41 the global landscape by providing a permissive environment for pursuing  
42 constructive U.S. policy goals worldwide.

43  

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<sup>7</sup> Weapons of Mass Effect are non-WMD capabilities that inflict widespread damage, disruption, and/or denial effects on material/non-material assets, to include population.

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### 1 **Implications for Strategic Deterrence.**

2  
3 Both the near- and mid-term security environments described above are  
4 marked by characteristics having profound implications for U.S. strategic  
5 deterrence strategy and practice.

6  
7 Multiple, Less Well Understood Adversaries: For the foreseeable future, the  
8 United States will continue to face an array of potential adversaries whose  
9 political, cultural, and idiosyncratic differences will complicate our efforts both  
10 to understand and to influence their perceptions for deterrent purposes. Not  
11 only are these potential adversaries less well understood, but they will almost  
12 certainly have problems understanding U.S. perceptions, commitments, and  
13 capabilities. This increases the likelihood of unilateral or mutual  
14 misperception, threatening to undercut strategic deterrence if not addressed  
15 through deterrence-focused intelligence efforts, effective information  
16 operations, and deterrence-enhancing transparency efforts.

17  
18 Widely Varying Risk-Taking Propensity: A broad array of potential adversaries  
19 means that strategic deterrence must be capable of successfully handling a  
20 similarly broad array of adversary risk-taking propensities. An adversary's  
21 risk-taking behavior can profoundly influence both his perception of a situation  
22 and the best means of influencing those perceptions. For example, the U.S.  
23 emerged from its Cold War experience with an unquestioned assumption that  
24 instilling uncertainty in an adversary's mind (regarding how the U.S. would  
25 respond to deterrence failure) would enhance deterrence by complicating the  
26 adversary's decision-making. However, this assumption is only appropriate  
27 vis-à-vis adversaries who are relatively risk-averse. Risk-averse adversaries  
28 view uncertainty as a threat because it makes careful, prudent calculation  
29 difficult or impossible, thus increasing their risk. However, an adversary with  
30 a greater propensity to run risks might well perceive the same uncertainty as  
31 an opportunity to be exploited (rather than as a threat to be avoided). Strategic  
32 deterrence needs to be sufficiently flexible to address both risk-averse and risk-  
33 taking adversaries, and provide means to exploit both adversary characteristics  
34 to enhance overall deterrence.

35  
36 Asymmetry of Stakes vs. Asymmetry of Power: U.S. military supremacy is not  
37 a guarantee of successful strategic deterrence. Despite the fact that the United  
38 States is almost certain to be militarily dominant over its adversaries in future  
39 strategic deterrence scenarios, those adversaries may believe that they have an  
40 asymmetrically higher stake in the outcome of the crisis or conflict. This  
41 asymmetry of stakes can undermine the effectiveness of strategic deterrence. If  
42 an adversary perceives that his stake in the confrontation is extremely high  
43 (e.g., regime preservation), while the U.S. stake in the crisis is not reasonably  
44 balanced by the possible cost of military involvement, he may find the threat of  
45 U.S. military action non-credible. This asymmetry of stakes can also work in  
46 the opposite direction. If the U.S. alone perceives its own outcome stake is

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1 incommensurate with the potential costs of involvement or escalation, the  
2 result could be “self-deterrence”.

3  
4 The challenge for strategic deterrence is to find ways of overcoming potential  
5 imbalances of stakes versus power that bolster the credibility of U.S.  
6 capabilities and prevent self-deterrence. An example of this would be military  
7 capabilities that significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to limit the  
8 damage an adversary can do to U.S. and allied/coalition forces and  
9 populations. For instance, to deter adversary WMD use, this new approach  
10 would require the synergistic, integrated combination of active and passive  
11 defenses combined with the capability to effectively employ preemptive or  
12 retaliatory counterforce attacks. Through the reduction of potential conflict  
13 costs to the U.S. and its allies, these capabilities help mitigate the negative  
14 effects of an asymmetry of stakes that would threaten to undermine deterrence.

15  
16 Vulnerabilities of U.S. Society and Forces: Both the U.S. economy and U.S.  
17 military forces are increasingly dependent on advanced technologies for their  
18 significant competitive advantages. While this technological superiority yields  
19 tremendous capabilities it also creates potential vulnerabilities that adversaries  
20 might exploit. Advanced computer network attack capabilities, capabilities to  
21 disable space systems, and electromagnetic pulse weapons could all provide  
22 adversaries means of undermining potentially decisive U.S. advantages. Both  
23 state and non-state actors will have significant abilities to conduct devastating  
24 covert attacks on the U.S. population, infrastructure, forces, and overseas  
25 interests. Free and open societies are uniquely vulnerable to terrorist tactics.  
26 The diffusion of biotechnology may allow states and well-organized groups to  
27 develop devastating bio-engineered weapons. U.S. strategic deterrence strategy  
28 needs to take these potential U.S. vulnerabilities fully into account, eliminating  
29 them where feasible, and compensating for them when necessary.

### 30 31 **SYNOPSIS OF THE CENTRAL IDEA**


32  
33 The Strategic Deterrence JOC describes how a JFC will plan, prepare, deploy,  
34 employ, and sustain a joint force to achieve strategic deterrence objectives set  
35 forth by the national leadership of the United States. In order to achieve these  
36 objectives (ends), joint forces must be able to employ various capabilities  
37 (means) to undertake operations and activities (ways) that can decisively  
38 influence the strategic deterrence center of gravity of potential adversaries: the  
39 decision-making calculus of key adversary decision-makers (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1: Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept

**Strategic Deterrence Center of Gravity: Decisively Influencing the Adversary’s Decision Calculus to Achieve Deterrence (Ends)**

10 Adversaries decide among alternative courses of action (COAs) based on their  
11 perception of the alternative outcomes that may result. They choose the course  
12 of action they believe will best serve their interests, as they perceive them. The  
13 objective of strategic deterrence is to convince potential adversaries that  
14 courses of action that threaten U.S. vital interests will result in outcomes that  
15 are decisively worse than they could achieve through alternative courses of  
16 action available to them. Strategic deterrence achieves this objective by  
17 decisively influencing an adversary’s decision calculus.

18  
19 An adversary’s strategic deterrence decision calculus contains three primary  
20 variables or factors:<sup>8</sup>

- 21
- 22 1. The adversary’s perception of the benefits of a COA
  - 23 2. The adversary’s perception of the costs of a COA
  - 24 3. The adversary’s perception of the consequences of restraint or  
25 inaction (i.e., what will happen to them if they do not take the COA in  
26 question)
- 27

---

<sup>8</sup> Adapted from the Strategic Deterrence Analytical Framework Model presented in the 2002 Strategic Deterrence JWCA Final Report. Additional model development (specific to SD JOC implementation) can be found in Nagy, Sievers, Weaver, et al., “Understanding Deterrence – A Seesaw Model” (unpublished, 2003).

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1 Understanding how these factors are interrelated is critically important to  
2 determining how best to influence an adversary's decision-making calculus.  
3 Adversaries weigh the perceived benefits and costs of a given COA in the  
4 context of their perceived consequences of restraint or inaction. Deterrence  
5 success is not solely a function of whether an adversary perceives the costs of a  
6 given COA as outweighing the benefits.<sup>9</sup> The costs of taking the action must  
7 also exceed the expected consequences of not taking the COA in question.  
8 Otherwise, deterrence may fail because an adversary will choose to undertake  
9 his minimum-consequence alternative rather than take no action at all (our  
10 strategic deterrence aim).

11  
12 As an example, the Japanese in World War II saw their loss of international  
13 stature, caused by the denial of access to raw materials to feed their industrial  
14 base, as a greater evil than a prolonged conflict with the U.S. This was despite  
15 the fact that numerous senior military leaders were well aware of the likelihood  
16 of ultimate defeat. For these reasons, the actions taken to induce adversary  
17 restraint may be comparable in importance to capabilities that impose cost or  
18 deny benefits.

19  
20 The perceived benefits and costs of a given COA have two essential elements  
21 that influence adversary decision-making. First, each benefit and cost has  
22 some relative value to the adversary, i.e., how much will he gain by reaping a  
23 given benefit or how much will he lose by incurring a particular cost. Second,  
24 each benefit and cost has a relative probability estimate associated with it, i.e.,  
25 how likely is it that he will reap a given benefit or incur a particular cost.

26  
27 One additional factor profoundly influences an adversary's decision calculus.  
28 An adversary's risk-taking propensity affects the relationship between values  
29 and probabilities of benefits and costs when in the process of reaching a  
30 decision. Risk-averse adversaries will see very low probability (but severe)  
31 costs as a powerful deterrent, while risk acceptant adversaries will discount  
32 costs in their pursuit of significant gains. Therefore, national leadership and  
33 the JFC need to understand the adversary's risk-taking propensity before  
34 formulating a set of joint operations and activities designed to achieve effective  
35 strategic deterrence.

36  
37 The central idea behind the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept is  
38 decisively influencing the adversary's strategic deterrence center of gravity, the  
39 decision-making calculus described above. This is the "end" or objective of  
40 joint operations designed to achieve strategic deterrence.

41

---

<sup>9</sup> This is a stylized view of deterrence often associated with rational choice/expected utility deterrence models of the Cold War era. The SD JOC expands upon rational choice considerations and incorporates elements of prospect theory in its approach. See Chapter 2, "U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies" by Watman and Wilkening, RAND Corporation, 1995.

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### 1 **Methods to Achieve Strategic Deterrence (Ways)**

2  
3 Effectively exercising decisive influence over an adversary's decision-making  
4 calculus in peacetime, crisis, and in war to achieve deterrence is best achieved  
5 by integrated, systematic efforts.<sup>10</sup> A "portfolio" approach reduces the  
6 likelihood of deterrence failure (through misunderstanding or miscalculation)  
7 and decreases the severity of consequences should a failure occur. Joint force  
8 operations and activities must be synchronized with the exercise of other  
9 instruments of national power to produce effective deterrence. Thus, military  
10 staffs must be engaged in the interagency process. Strategic deterrence  
11 stretches from peacetime operations and activities designed to shape the  
12 conditions for peace or war, through crisis, armed conflict, escalation/de-  
13 escalation, war termination, and post-hostilities operations. While the primary  
14 focus of strategic deterrence will be a specific adversary's key decision-makers,  
15 there may be overlapping deterrence objectives vis-à-vis the same adversary.  
16 For example, strategic deterrence aimed against a regional adversary might  
17 seek to deter: the invasion of a U.S. ally; use of WMD at the outset of such an  
18 invasion (if the primary objective is not achieved); escalation to the use of WMD  
19 during subsequent phases of the conflict; and the adversary exporting WMD  
20 during the conflict. Additional strategic deterrence efforts aimed at other  
21 adversaries can also occur during a specific crisis or conflict. For example, in  
22 the regional war outlined above, measures intended to: 1) deter third parties  
23 from intervening in the conflict (or instigating a separate conflict) and 2) deter  
24 aggression by other regional adversaries could readily be taking place in  
25 combination with the strategic deterrence efforts aimed at the primary  
26 belligerent. Thus, strategic deterrence often spans both time (including the  
27 various situations of peace, crisis, and war) and geographic space  
28 encompassing multiple AORs simultaneously.

29  
30 Effective strategic deterrence results from tailoring and orchestrating available  
31 ways and means to achieve specific ends. The "end" of a joint strategic  
32 deterrence effort is to achieve decisive influence over the adversary's decision  
33 calculus. The "means" of a joint strategic deterrence effort are the panoply of  
34 military capabilities and activities under the control of the JFC in peacetime,  
35 crisis, and war. The "ways" of strategic deterrence efforts, however, form the  
36 heart of the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept.

37  
38 There are three "ways" to exercise influence over an adversary's decision-  
39 making calculus to achieve strategic deterrence. The first is to credibly  
40 threaten to deny him the benefits or gains sought. The second is to credibly  
41 threaten to impose costs that are viewed as too painful to incur. The third is to  
42 induce adversary restraint by influencing his perception of what will happen to  
43 him if he does not act (his consequences of restraint).

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<sup>10</sup> For an illustrative example of systematic integration of these "ways" see Appendix A.

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1 For maximum effectiveness, strategic deterrence must incorporate all three of  
2 these “ways” of deterring threats to U.S. vital interests in an integrated  
3 manner. These “ways” of strategic deterrence are not to be treated as  
4 “either/or” propositions. All three “ways” of strategic deterrence must be  
5 integrated in a mutually reinforcing manner to maximize our prospects of  
6 success across the full range of adversaries we may face. Both U.S. national  
7 deterrence strategy and the military component of that strategy (operations,  
8 activities, and capabilities governed by this Strategic Deterrence Joint  
9 Operating Concept) must present all potential adversaries (capable of posing a  
10 strategic threat to U.S. vital interests) with an overarching American strategic  
11 deterrence posture. That posture must convince adversary decision-makers  
12 that in taking an action the U.S. seeks to deter they will:

- 13
- 14 1. Fail to achieve their objectives/reap the benefits they seek
- 15 2. Incur severe costs that outweigh perceived benefits
- 16 3. Suffer a worse outcome than had they opted not to take the action the  
17 U.S. seeks to deter.
- 18

19 However, because the perceptions and resulting decision calculus of specific  
20 adversaries in specific circumstances are fundamentally different, our  
21 deterrence efforts must also be tailored in character and emphasis to address  
22 those differences.

23

24 This Joint Operating Concept applies equally to deterring both state and non-  
25 state actors. Rational, human decision-makers choose among alternative  
26 COAs based on their perceptions of the potential outcomes that may result.  
27 However, there are likely to be profound differences in the content of state and  
28 non-state actors’ decision-making calculations, differences that (in many cases)  
29 make non-state actors more difficult to deter, especially with the means  
30 traditionally used to deter state actor aggression.<sup>11</sup> While there is considerable  
31 overlap of the specific means used to influence both state and non-state actor  
32 decision-making, there will be significant differences as well (see Figure 2, page  
33 47, for applicability). Such differences are also called out in the capabilities  
34 section of this document, where appropriate.

35

36 In crafting U.S. strategic deterrence operations a careful balance must be  
37 struck between oversimplifying an adversary’s decision calculus and imparting  
38 greater understanding of an adversary’s calculus than is realistically  
39 achievable. Thus, a critical element of successful strategic deterrence  
40 operations is identifying and managing key uncertainties. Such uncertainties  
41 will always exist, and U.S. strategic deterrence operations must be planned and  
42 conducted so as to take these inevitable uncertainties into account.

---

<sup>11</sup> For example, non-state actors may: 1) see benefit in violent action in and of itself, 2) likely have few overt, high value assets to hold at risk, and 3) often perceive the continuation of the status quo as intolerably costly (as opposed to merely less desirable than achieving their objective).

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1  
2 Key strategic deterrence uncertainties take two main forms. The first is U.S.  
3 uncertainty regarding key adversary perceptions, the core ingredient in an  
4 adversary's decision calculus. As an example, before the 9/11 attacks how did  
5 the al Qaeda leadership perceive the potential costs of carrying their terror  
6 campaign to U.S. territory? Such perceptions cannot be fully and  
7 unambiguously known with high confidence, and the extent of our uncertainty  
8 will vary significantly from adversary to adversary. However, considerable  
9 insight into the critical content of adversary decision calculations can be  
10 developed through dedicated intelligence collection and analytical effort. There  
11 is much room for improvement in this area. We may be unable to resolve some  
12 key uncertainties regarding adversary perceptions, but still be able to identify  
13 deterrence COAs that take such uncertainties into account. Our planning  
14 must explicitly recognize that it is critically important to determine what "we  
15 know we don't know".

16  
17 The second form is adversary uncertainty regarding factors that critically  
18 influence their assessment of alternative COA outcomes. For example, a key  
19 uncertainty influencing Imperial Japanese calculations (regarding whether to  
20 attack the United States in 1941) was how the U.S. would respond. Again, our  
21 strategic deterrence operations must be developed and conducted with these  
22 adversary uncertainties in mind, increasing or reducing them as our deterrence  
23 strategy dictates.

### 24 **Deterrence by Denying Benefits**

25  
26 Deterrence by denying benefits involves the threatened use of joint forces to  
27 convince an adversary that the benefits sought are of little value and/or are  
28 unlikely to be achieved by taking the COA the U.S. seeks to deter. Denying  
29 benefits can include both defensive and offensive capabilities and activities.  
30 For example, ballistic missile defenses that successfully shoot down adversary  
31 missiles are an example of an operational capability that helps provide  
32 deterrence by denying benefits. Another example is having the capability to  
33 sustain continuity of effective military operations in the midst or wake of a  
34 major enemy attack in the homeland (this capability is discussed under the  
35 "Emergency Preparedness" mission set in the Homeland Security JOC).  
36 Possession of this capability reduces the prospect that an adversary could  
37 cripple the U.S. ability to execute effective military operations. Offensive  
38 operations that contribute to deterrence by denying benefits include  
39 counterforce attacks on adversary WMD stocks and means of delivery that  
40 prevent him from achieving military gains through the procurement (or actual  
41 use) of WMD.

42  
43 In circumstances marked by a pronounced asymmetry of stakes, and  
44 confrontation with highly risk-acceptant adversaries, denying benefits takes on  
45 increased importance due to the potential for such adversaries to discount the  
46 severity and/or the likelihood of the costs the U.S. might impose should the

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1 adversary undertake the proscribed act. This makes deterrence by denying  
2 benefits increasingly important in both the near-term and mid-term security  
3 environments discussed earlier.

### 4 5 **Deterrence by Imposing Costs**

6  
7 Deterrence by cost imposition involves the use of joint forces to convince an  
8 adversary that the costs incurred (if he takes the COA the U.S. seeks to deter)  
9 will be severe--and there is high probability that the United States will impose  
10 these costs. Cost imposition includes the full array of traditional offensive  
11 operations associated with strategic deterrence during the Cold War. For  
12 example, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to play a unique role in enhancing  
13 strategic deterrence for the indefinite future. However, new forms of both  
14 offensive and defensive operations will also provide capabilities to impose high  
15 costs. Advanced information operations and direct action raids by special  
16 operations forces can impose costs that many potential adversaries would  
17 perceive to be unacceptable. These operations can be accomplished at modest  
18 cost to the United States. Highly precise, conventional strike systems targeted  
19 on highly-valued adversary assets can also achieve physical effects that are  
20 psychologically intimidating and qualitatively different than traditional  
21 conventional strike capabilities. These attacks can create a widespread sense  
22 of hopelessness, sanctuary denial, and demonstrated escalation dominance,  
23 while still limiting collateral damage. Missile and other active and passive  
24 defenses can serve to increase the perceived probability of severe preemptive or  
25 retaliatory responses by increasing the confidence of U.S. leaders in their  
26 ability to limit damage to the United States and its allies.

27  
28 The key challenge to improving the effectiveness of deterrence by cost  
29 imposition is to overcome adversary perceptions that they can successfully  
30 deter the U.S. (or the U.S. will be self-deterred) from imposing severe costs.  
31 Improved offensive and defensive damage limitation capabilities for the U.S.  
32 homeland, U.S. allies, and forward-deployed U.S. forces are essential to  
33 addressing this challenge.

### 34 35 **Deterrence by Inducing Adversary Restraint**

36  
37 Inducing adversary restraint is the "way" to influence an adversary's decision  
38 calculus that is least amenable to military means. However, the JFC can  
39 achieve this effect under certain circumstances, and such deterrent measures  
40 should be considered if they are consistent with broader U.S. interests and war  
41 aims in a crisis or conflict. For example, U.S. joint doctrine might call for  
42 theater operations to be conducted in a manner that could inadvertently  
43 mislead an adversary about the nature of U.S. objectives in the conflict, or that  
44 might impose unintended severe costs on the adversary. Either of these  
45 circumstances could result in the adversary choosing to escalate a conflict that  
46 could have remained limited in scope and means. A JFC could alter the way in

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1 which his forces operate under such circumstances in order to avoid making  
2 undesirable adversary escalation the adversary's "least bad alternative". It is  
3 crucial that these mitigation actions are clearly communicated to (and  
4 understood by) the adversary and other third parties to the conflict.  
5

6 In some scenarios the nature of U.S. war aims will be fundamentally  
7 inconsistent with inducing adversary restraint. This is primarily true when  
8 overarching U.S. objectives conflict with the adversary's critical objectives, such  
9 as regime survival. In such instances, the role of strategic deterrence in an  
10 integrated U.S. strategy may be significantly diminished, or eliminated  
11 altogether. However, it may still be possible for the JFC to conduct inducement  
12 operations to sway adversaries below the primary decision-making level who  
13 can react positively to U.S. strategic deterrence efforts.  
14

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### **NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES (MEANS)**

Military strategic deterrence capabilities are the “means” by which the JFC implements the overarching joint operating concept. These capabilities must be effective against a range of potential adversaries across a multitude of scenarios, including both state and non-state actors. These capabilities must be sufficiently credible to deter any adversary through their perceived utility and usability. Successful strategic deterrence requires the capability impact be visible to the adversary and be perceived as implementing an unequivocal national will to protect and further U.S. vital interests. The ability to communicate this resolve and associated deterrent capabilities in a tailored way to individual adversary decision-makers is vital. Coalition support should be integrated, when available, to enhance deterrence credibility, but strategic deterrence also must be viable as a unilateral strategy.

Consequently, future U.S. joint forces must be capable of successfully carrying out denial and cost imposition operations and of providing unmistakable signals of national resolve to a wide range of potential adversaries. This means U.S. joint forces must be able to defend against unprovoked attack, provide responsive global delivery of intended cost imposition effects, and possess the clear-cut ability to combine these capabilities to dominate an escalating conflict. Should deterrence fail, these forces must provide a seamless transition in support of major combat and/or homeland defense operations, as well as coexist with other major combat, homeland defense, and/or stability operations.

Direct capabilities required for strategic deterrence include the ability to carry out: force projection operations, including the capability to decisively defeat regional aggression; kinetic and non-kinetic Global Strike operations, including the possible employment of nuclear weapons; active and passive defense measures; strategic deterrence information operations; inducement operations; and space control operations. All of these efforts are enabled by global situational awareness, command and control, overseas presence, and allied/coalition military cooperation and integration. Because these enabling capabilities underpin the more direct capabilities required for strategic deterrence, they are discussed first in this section.

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1  
2 **Global Situational Awareness**  
3

4 Global situational awareness is the foundation of strategic deterrence and  
5 includes specific strategic deterrence intelligence efforts. Strategic deterrence  
6 intelligence takes two forms. The first is the underlying information regarding  
7 adversary decision-makers' perceptions of benefits, costs, and consequences of  
8 restraint on which deterrence operations are based. The second is the  
9 operational intelligence information about adversary assets, capabilities, and  
10 vulnerabilities required to conduct credible and effective deterrence operations.  
11

12 Improved understanding of adversary decision-makers' value structures and  
13 perceptions (beyond what is typically provided to U.S. decision-makers today)  
14 enhances our ability to tailor deterrence operations against each potential foe  
15 under varying scenario conditions. The JFC, supported by the national  
16 intelligence community, must identify and profile adversary decision-makers to  
17 identify adversary value structures, as well as the decision-making structures  
18 and processes in which adversary decision-makers interact. Data already  
19 existing in numerous military, agency and allied/coalition databases must be  
20 mined and analyzed for its deterrence value. The ability to translate foreign  
21 language information (electronic or hardcopy) in near-real time is needed to  
22 improve our understanding of diverse adversaries. Because strategic  
23 deterrence is a full spectrum campaign conducted predominantly in peacetime,  
24 many crucial elements necessary to fully characterize potential adversaries  
25 need to be given a higher collection priority than has been traditionally  
26 associated with non-crisis periods.  
27

28 The ultimate goal of this information collection and analysis is to develop actor-  
29 specific analyses of adversary decision-making that describe an adversary's  
30 values, culture, decision calculus, risk propensity, and capacity for situational  
31 awareness to the maximum extent possible. These ISR efforts also seek to  
32 identify the adversary's potential attack means (that our forces will seek to  
33 deny success) and the most appropriate targets to be attacked (to deliver on  
34 deterrent cost imposition threats). Interagency cooperation will be a key to  
35 achieving success in these efforts. It will require creation of a collaborative  
36 environment that incorporates intelligence community, diplomatic, law  
37 enforcement, armed service, and multinational inputs to achieve true global  
38 situational awareness for strategic deterrence.  
39

40 Effective and credible strategic deterrence operations will also require specific  
41 enabling improvements in our global situational awareness regarding key  
42 adversary assets and capabilities. Assets (military, economic, social, etc.)  
43 highly valued by adversary leaders will need to be identified, catalogued,  
44 weaponized, and maintained in digital format readily available for strike  
45 planning. Where information gaps exist, full-spectrum ISR will seek to provide  
46 persistent surveillance of leadership figures, facilities, proliferation

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1 mechanisms and high-value forces, and do so in the face of increasingly  
2 sophisticated adversary denial and deception efforts. ISR efforts must be  
3 persistent across time, be seamless across key geographic regions, take  
4 advantage of the most capable collection platforms, gather data across the  
5 information spectrum (from human sources to the most sophisticated technical  
6 means available) and benefit from cooperation and timely cross-cueing of  
7 national agency, overhead and sensitive reconnaissance assets. Human  
8 intelligence must focus on gaining access and insights into the most difficult  
9 "targets," e.g., terrorist cells, hard and deeply buried targets, closed regimes,  
10 WMD/E weapons development efforts, and deployment plans. Effective human  
11 intelligence will enable better positioning of technical collection systems.  
12 Human intelligence reporting must be integrated into situational awareness  
13 displays that provide joint forces with battlespace visualization. Once cued on a  
14 foreign 'target' of interest, seamless machine-to-machine interfaces amongst  
15 technical collection systems will help ensure no activity of interest goes  
16 unnoticed or unanalyzed.

17  
18 Because WMD/E play such an important role in adversary strategies, our  
19 ability to identify their location, specific nature, origin, ownership, supporting  
20 capabilities, or the source of their employment is crucial for strategic  
21 deterrence. WMD/E attribution is particularly important for deterring state  
22 sponsorship of WMD/E terrorism and some covert attacks by nation-states.  
23 Technical capabilities to support attribution are required for nuclear, chemical,  
24 biological, radiological and explosive weapons as well as attacks on space  
25 systems and computer networks.

26  
27 Successful strategic deterrence also requires much improved understanding of  
28 our own capabilities, limitations, and current situation (blue force tracking and  
29 force status, to include our allies and interagency partners). Such  
30 understanding can be achieved by exploiting a shared information, shared  
31 awareness, and shared understanding of the situation across a networked  
32 infrastructure by means of a collaborative information environment. Highly  
33 networked forces will increase the commander's flexibility to substitute widely  
34 varying types of forces or capabilities to achieve the same deterrence value.

35  
36 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Strategic deterrence intelligence on  
37 adversaries' perceptions will identify the key benefits adversaries may seek  
38 from courses of action we intend to deter. Additionally, this intelligence will  
39 provide insights into how to convince them that the U.S. has the capability and  
40 will to deny them those benefits with high confidence. Global situational  
41 awareness improves our ability to defeat adversaries' critical capabilities and  
42 operations. An example would be U.S. global situational awareness sufficient  
43 to convince an adversary that his chances of achieving the strategic or tactical  
44 surprise he deems necessary are extremely low.

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1 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Strategic deterrence intelligence on  
2 adversaries' perceptions will identify the key costs adversaries fear, and provide  
3 insights into how to convince them it is highly likely that the U.S. can (and will)  
4 impose such costs. In the face of increasingly sophisticated adversary efforts to  
5 conceal and protect key assets and capabilities from U.S. strike warfare  
6 operations, improved global situational awareness is absolutely essential to  
7 conducting credible cost imposition operations. This is a particularly acute  
8 strategic deterrence challenge vis-à-vis holding adversary WMD/E and national  
9 leadership assets credibly at risk. Improved global situational awareness also  
10 reduces strategic or tactical surprise, thereby improving force survival. This  
11 increases the likelihood the U.S. will conduct preemptive or escalatory  
12 response options to impose costs on the adversary.  
13

14 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Global situational awareness  
15 capabilities can have two distinct impacts here. In the case of state actors,  
16 undetected escalation in the adversary's perception of the consequences of  
17 "being deterred" is the most likely cause of strategic deterrence failure.  
18 Therefore, accurate strategic deterrence intelligence (regarding an adversary's  
19 perceived consequences of his own restraint) throughout an unfolding crisis or  
20 conflict is required to induce adversary restraint. We cannot mitigate a critical  
21 adversary concern of which we are unaware, or that we underestimate.  
22 Second, global situational awareness provides the JFC with information  
23 regarding an adversary's ability to understand the current situation. This  
24 allows the JFC to shape U.S. operations so as to ensure they do not pose  
25 unintended threats to key adversary interests.  
26

## 27 **Command and Control**

28  
29 All capabilities supporting strategic deterrence rely on the existence of robust,  
30 reliable, secure, survivable, timely, unambiguous and sustainable DOD-wide  
31 command and control. A horizontally and vertically integrated distributed  
32 network is required to provide key leadership (e.g., President, Secretary of  
33 Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Combatant  
34 Commanders, Service Chiefs, and subordinate JFCs) with an effective  
35 command and control capability. This network must be resilient and provide  
36 for secure collaboration, and real-time decision making. It must support  
37 planning, tasking and dynamic control for the efficient conduct of strategic  
38 deterrence. This strategic capability requires a redundant system of multi-  
39 domain communications technologies to convince adversaries they cannot  
40 easily disrupt or deny U.S. command and control. The C2 system must provide  
41 secure, wideband communications that will degrade gracefully to a survivable  
42 thin-line backbone--providing connectivity to decision-makers under the most  
43 severe circumstances. Additionally, senior U.S. leadership may require the  
44 ability to directly communicate with fielded forces or initiate weapons  
45 employment without support from intermediate levels of command.  
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1 In addition to physical C2 systems, today's organizational C2 constructs may  
2 prove inadequate for the Joint Force of 2015. C2 is more than bandwidth—  
3 process is critical. Historically, military forces have been controlled through a  
4 strict hierarchy of chains of command, with large sections of resources  
5 performing identical tasks in a small area of unison.<sup>12</sup> Today's joint forces,  
6 operating in complex environments, act more in concert than in unison due in  
7 part to C2 issues. Dispersed groups coordinate independent actions to achieve  
8 overall objectives, but not in a truly integrated fashion. JTF mission  
9 accomplishment increasingly relies upon access to enhanced joint capabilities  
10 with less regard for the static command relationships inhibited by our present  
11 C2 structure. Unity of effort now contributes more to success than unity of  
12 command—because the only commander with enough overarching authority (to  
13 execute the national strategy of strategic deterrence) is the Commander in  
14 Chief. Therefore, JFCs must incorporate synchronized, collaborative decision-  
15 making and decision support environments to leverage a shared Commander's  
16 Intent. Providing the "right" data to national decision-makers at the "right"  
17 time will allow for consistent unity of effort when implementing strategic  
18 deterrence activities.

19  
20 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Without robust, reliable, secure,  
21 survivable, timely, unambiguous and sustainable C2 capabilities, an adversary  
22 might perceive a decisive asymmetric advantage in launching a surprise attack.  
23 This would permit him to attain his key benefits while U.S. forces were  
24 rendered temporarily incapable of counteraction or response. Therefore, C2  
25 capabilities contribute to denying benefits by ensuring no adversary believes he  
26 can prevent U.S. forces from being brought to bear in the effective and timely  
27 manner intended by the American national leadership.

28  
29 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Similarly, the C2 capabilities outlined above  
30 are an essential enabler of credible American threats to impose unacceptable  
31 costs on potential adversaries. If adversaries perceive an opportunity to  
32 significantly disrupt or delay a decisive American response to their aggression  
33 or coercion, they may convince themselves they can escape such a response  
34 altogether. In addition, such C2 capabilities are essential to make full, effective  
35 use of the global situational awareness capabilities described above to credibly  
36 impose carefully-tailored costs on the adversary.

37  
38 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Conducting operations that  
39 achieve U.S. objectives without inadvertently crossing key adversary thresholds  
40 requires sophisticated C2 capabilities to exploit global situational awareness.  
41 Convincing adversaries that U.S. war aims are limited (through exercise of  
42 positive C2), and that U.S. forces can rapidly transition to the pursuit of  
43 escalated war aims, is essential to inducing adversary restraint.

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<sup>12</sup> "Rethinking the Principles of War," Morgan, Mc Ivor, et al., Naval Institute Proceedings, Oct 03, p. 36.

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**Overseas Presence**

In 2015, strategic deterrence will continue to be enhanced by U.S. military capabilities resident in forward-stationed and forward-deployed multi-purpose combat and expeditionary forces across the globe. Our overseas presence demonstrates commitment to the defense of U.S. vital interests, in some cases ensuring that an attack on a U.S. ally will be an attack on U.S. forces as well. Overseas presence also enhances U.S. global situational awareness by providing forward-based ISR assets that significantly augment national technical means. Overseas presence is an enabler of both allied/coalition military cooperation and integration and force projection operations.

Contributions to Denying Benefits: Overseas presence of U.S. forces has several powerful impacts on adversary perceptions. It reduces the likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise. It forestalls surprise attacks that may be costly for the U.S. to reverse by force. It also reduces the probability that U.S. allies will rapidly capitulate in the face of coercion or attack, making it more likely that they will fight and persevere alongside American forces. In those cases where a key adversary's benefit is the reduction or elimination of U.S. overseas presence (e.g., al Qaeda), the continued forward basing of U.S. forces in itself serves to convince the adversary (and/or potential supporters and recruits) that he cannot achieve his objectives through aggression or coercion. Proper force protection measures are critical, as is an understanding of host nation perceptions of the U.S. presence. This helps ensure the presence does not provide "targets" for adversaries, and our presence is properly weighted so as not to antagonize local populations.

Contributions to Imposing Costs: Overseas presence indicates U.S. political will and resolve to oppose potential adversary aggression and coercion in a region, particularly with reference to formal alliance and security relationships. This in turn makes U.S. threats to impose key costs on potential adversaries more credible. Overseas presence can both enable preemptive use of force and reduce the perceived response time of the joint force. This can be a decisive factor in some strategic deterrence situations. Overseas presence also provides the JFC with an established set of basing and logistical infrastructure enabling rapid reinforcement, improved force projection, and Global Strike operations. Overseas presence in some cases serves to extend the U.S. nuclear deterrent over both forward-based forces and regional allies, significantly increasing an adversary's perceptions of the potential costs involved in taking courses of action we seek to deter.

Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: The role of overseas presence in inducing adversary restraint is primarily seen by imagining its absence. Without overseas presence, a U.S. decision to deploy major combat forces to a

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1 region in anticipation of (or in response to) adversary coercion or aggression  
2 could be seen as a more threatening American response than the alert or  
3 reinforcement of forward-based forces. Thus, overseas presence provides  
4 American national leadership a more measured, and potentially less  
5 provocative, set of deterrent options.  
6

### 7 **Allied/Coalition Military Cooperation and Integration**

8  
9 U.S. vital interests are increasingly intertwined with those of U.S. friends and  
10 allies. As a result, strategic deterrence can in some instances be enhanced  
11 through military cooperation and integration with allied/coalition forces. The  
12 deterrent impact of such cooperation and integration is both political and  
13 military in nature. The political impacts are primarily derived from: 1) the  
14 effects that coalition-based responses have on an adversary's perception of U.S.  
15 and allied political will, and of 2) the potentially long-lasting, harmful post-  
16 conflict political and economic effects of taking on a U.S.-led international  
17 coalition. The military impacts are derived from improvements in both U.S.  
18 and coalition capabilities to defeat adversary military operations. Allied and  
19 Coalition contributions to the joint fight are significant. For example, they can  
20 provide host nation security, fly additional sorties, supplement naval presence,  
21 provide additional maneuver forces, conduct maritime and ground mine  
22 clearing operations, to name just a few. These actions contribute significantly  
23 to force protection and overall operational success.  
24

25 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Allied/coalition military cooperation and  
26 integration creates a shared political security burden and an improved ability  
27 to limit the damage an adversary can inflict. This undercuts an adversary's  
28 ability to coerce the U.S. and its allies. It also reduces the potential benefits to  
29 be reaped from a surprise attack before the U.S. is fully deployed in theater. In  
30 many cases, allied/coalition military cooperation and integration provides U.S.  
31 forces the basing and logistical support needed to accelerate reinforcement and  
32 force projection, making adversary gains less likely. In some instances, allies  
33 can provide force capabilities essential to deterrence by denying benefits that  
34 would be difficult or costly for the U.S. to match (e.g., extensive ground forces).  
35 There are even cases where focused allied/coalition military cooperation and  
36 integration allows an ally to deter on its own through denying benefits without  
37 U.S. involvement in combat operations.  
38

39 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Allied/coalition military cooperation and  
40 integration can have a tremendous impact on the adversary's perception of the  
41 political will of the U.S. and its allies. These activities increase the perceived  
42 probability that an adversary will incur costs should they take actions contrary  
43 to U.S. vital interests. Such costs include, but are not limited to: U.S.  
44 intervention itself; the loss of critical military and economic capabilities; longer-  
45 term political and economic costs associated with becoming a "pariah" state (as  
46 a result of conflict with a U.S.-led coalition); and even regime destruction at the

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1 hands of an internationally sanctioned military campaign. Most of the military  
2 impacts of allied/coalition cooperation and integration that contribute to  
3 denying benefits contribute to cost imposition efforts as well. An additional  
4 significant cost imposition impact is the potential for U.S. and allied force  
5 synergies that free up U.S. military assets to focus on imposing costs, rather  
6 than only denying benefits. An example would be allied/coalition air forces  
7 providing air defense, freeing U.S. air assets to be employed primarily in strike  
8 operations.

9  
10 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: A potential impact of these  
11 activities is to convince an adversary that U.S. allies will exercise increased  
12 restraining influence over American war aims and associated military  
13 operations. However, additional contributions of allied/coalition military  
14 cooperation and integration to inducing adversary restraint are limited.

### 15 16 **Force Projection**

17  
18 The capability to project U.S. military power globally and conduct effective  
19 theater-level, military operations across the domains of air, sea, land, space,  
20 and information--including the capability to win decisively in a Major Combat  
21 Operation (MCO)--is essential to strategic deterrence. Force projection  
22 capability greatly enhances the JFC's capacity to use all three "ways" of  
23 influencing an adversary's decision-making. U.S. force projection capabilities  
24 need to be responsive, sustainable, and executable in the face of anti-access  
25 strategies, WMD employment, and other means of asymmetric warfare. For  
26 strategic deterrence it is especially critical that force projection operations be  
27 executable such that we can limit the damage an adversary can inflict--on U.S.  
28 forces, allies, and potentially their own civilian populace.

29  
30 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Force projection capabilities provide the  
31 means to deny a broad range of perceived benefits that adversaries might seek  
32 through aggression and coercion. These perceived benefits could include (but  
33 are not limited to): seizure and occupation of allied territory; destruction of (or  
34 damage to) key allied political, military and/or economic assets; closure or  
35 interference with geographic choke points of strategic significance; coercive  
36 threat or use of force against U.S. allies; deterrence of U.S. intervention in a  
37 regional conflict; and coercive limitation of U.S. war aims in such a conflict.

38  
39 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Force projection capabilities also provide the  
40 JFC with the means to impose a set of critical costs on adversaries. These  
41 include, but are not limited to: seizure/occupation of high-value adversary  
42 territory; interdiction of adversary access to international air and sea lines of  
43 communication; destruction of highly valued political, military, and/or  
44 economic assets; destruction/disruption of the adversary's internal political  
45 control; and forcible regime change. The same force projection attributes  
46 delineated above are required for the cost imposition role.

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1  
2 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Finally, our force projection  
3 capabilities can induce adversary restraint prior to (or in the midst of) a conflict  
4 only if they can be employed in a selective and highly controlled manner that  
5 permits adversaries to discern U.S. restraint and the potential for this restraint  
6 to be lifted (should deterrence fail and escalation occur). For example, in a  
7 scenario in which U.S. war aims are limited, the JFC should have the ability to  
8 project force in a way that communicates the limited nature of his objectives,  
9 and does not render the adversary incapable of discerning whether current  
10 operations are merely a precursor to a more ambitious set of U.S. aims. In this  
11 strategic deterrence context, disabling a regional state's entire political-military  
12 command and control system (when U.S. military objectives do not require  
13 such a strategic effect) could profoundly undermine strategic deterrence.

14  
15 **Nuclear Strike Capabilities**

16  
17 Survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental  
18 values intact and its institutions and people secure, remains our nation's  
19 permanent and primary security interest. This interest is best achieved by a  
20 defense posture that makes possible nuclear war outcomes so dangerous, as  
21 calculated by potential adversaries, that the adversary's desire to initiate  
22 aggression is removed. U.S. nuclear forces contribute uniquely and  
23 fundamentally to strategic deterrence--through their ability to impose costs  
24 and deny benefits to an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and devastating  
25 manner no adversary can counter.

26  
27 Nuclear weapons provide the President with the ultimate means to terminate  
28 conflict promptly on terms favorable to the United States. They cast a lengthy  
29 shadow over a rational adversary's decision calculus when considering  
30 coercion, aggression, WMD employment, and escalatory courses of action.  
31 Nuclear weapons threaten destruction of an adversary's most highly valued  
32 assets, including adversary WMD/E capabilities, critical industries, key  
33 resources, and means of political organization and control (including the  
34 adversary leadership itself). This includes destruction of targets otherwise  
35 invulnerable to conventional attack, e.g., hard and deeply buried facilities,  
36 "location uncertainty" targets, etc. Nuclear weapons reduce an adversary's  
37 confidence in their ability to control wartime escalation.

38  
39 The revitalization of our nuclear support infrastructure (including the  
40 transition to an improved testing posture), the retaining of scientific expertise  
41 and tradesmen and the ability to produce new weapons is critically important  
42 to dissuading potential adversaries from engaging in a potentially costly arms  
43 race. Barring these improvements, a legacy force structure supported by a  
44 neglected infrastructure invites adversary misbehavior and miscalculation.

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1 The use (or threatened use) of nuclear weapons can also reestablish deterrence  
2 of further adversary WMD employment. Alternatively, nuclear weapons can  
3 constrain an adversary's WMD employment through U.S. counterforce strikes  
4 aimed at destroying adversary escalatory options. Nuclear weapons provide the  
5 U.S. with proportionate and disproportionate response options that an  
6 adversary cannot counter. They can also help deter intervention by adversary  
7 allies in an ongoing conflict.

8  
9 Although advances in conventional kinetic and non-kinetic means {e.g.,  
10 computer network attack (CNA), High Energy Radio Frequency (HERF), directed  
11 energy (DE), etc.} by 2015 will undoubtedly supplement U.S. nuclear  
12 capabilities to achieve these effects, nuclear weapons that are reliable,  
13 accurate, and flexible will retain a qualitative advantage in their ability to  
14 demonstrate U.S. resolve on the world stage. These capabilities should be  
15 further enhanced by improving our capability to integrate nuclear and non-  
16 nuclear strike operations. Providing the President an enhanced range of  
17 options for both limiting collateral damage and denying adversaries sanctuary  
18 from attack will increase the credibility of U.S. nuclear threats, thus enhancing  
19 deterrence and making the actual use of nuclear weapons less likely.  
20 Additionally, nuclear weapons allow the U.S. to rapidly accomplish the  
21 wholesale disruption of an adversary nation-state with limited U.S. national  
22 resources. While the legacy force was well suited for successful deterrence  
23 throughout the Cold War, an enhanced nuclear arsenal will remain a vital  
24 component of strategic deterrence in the foreseeable security environment.

25  
26 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Nuclear capabilities provide in many cases  
27 the ultimate means to impose costs. They have the potential to deny an  
28 adversary sanctuary for his key assets. The nature of the costs nuclear  
29 weapons impose, and the speed and inevitability with which those costs can be  
30 imposed, is qualitatively different from even our most advanced conventional  
31 capabilities. The most important limitation on their cost imposition impact is  
32 the credibility of our willingness to use them in conflict. Clearly, this credibility  
33 is in large part a function of the threat magnitude that nuclear weapons use  
34 would counter. However, selective improvements and innovations in our  
35 nuclear capabilities could significantly enhance their use credibility.

36  
37 Contributions to Denying Benefits: U.S. nuclear capabilities can help convince  
38 an adversary that even the defeat of U.S. or allied/coalition conventional forces  
39 can be rapidly and decisively reversed. The most prominent example of this is  
40 the ability of U.S. nuclear responses to deny an adversary any military  
41 advantage from WMD/E use. Nuclear capabilities also provide U.S. national  
42 leadership with a wide range of escalation control and damage limitation  
43 options that aid in convincing adversaries they are unlikely to deter U.S.  
44 intervention in a conflict they initiate (or coerce the U.S. and its allies through  
45 threats and intimidation). Nuclear weapons assure allies that the U.S. can  
46 (and will) deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attack,

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1 thereby bolstering allied political will, and making the benefits of adversary  
2 aggression or coercion less likely. Finally, the ability of nuclear weapons to  
3 deny an adversary sanctuary from attack helps convince him the benefits he  
4 seeks through aggression are unlikely to be achieved.

5  
6 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: In many cases where the  
7 adversary is convinced that the cost of aggression or coercion will be a U.S.  
8 nuclear response, other considerations will tend to pale in comparison. The  
9 costs potentially imposed by credible U.S. nuclear use can (in many scenarios)  
10 obviate consideration of such consequences of restraint. However, it should be  
11 noted that when an adversary perceives truly severe consequences of restraint,  
12 and has reason to doubt U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons, deterrence  
13 could fail despite our nuclear capabilities.

### 14 **Active and Passive Defenses**

15  
16  
17 The development and deployment of effective active and passive defenses will  
18 contribute significantly to strategic deterrence, particularly in the areas of  
19 deterring adversary WMD use or attacks on U.S. population and critical U.S.  
20 military and civil infrastructure.

21  
22 Ballistic and cruise missile active defenses will be a crucial element of U.S.  
23 military capabilities in 2015. These defenses will be layered and networked,  
24 incorporating land-, sea-, air-, and space-based elements, and will use both  
25 kinetic and non-kinetic means to achieve target destruction and/or negation.  
26 Regionally oriented defenses will protect fielded U.S. forces and allies, and will  
27 seamlessly integrate with homeland defenses to provide overlapping and  
28 complementary global protection. Additionally, the ISR and C2 elements of  
29 active missile defenses will enable a robust offense/defense integration, to  
30 include long- or very-long range counter-battery fires aimed at destroying the  
31 adversary's missile launch capabilities. The ability to thwart adversary missile  
32 attacks prior to launch as well as to shoot missiles down in flight is key to  
33 achieving effective strategic deterrence while enhancing a JFC's economy of  
34 force efforts. Near-peer nation-state adversaries may seek to defeat such active  
35 defenses in order to hold the American homeland hostage and constrain U.S.  
36 freedom of action. However, most potential adversaries are unlikely to be able  
37 to overcome U.S. active missile defense capabilities through 2015.

38 Passive defenses complement active defenses, reducing the effectiveness of  
39 attacks that active defenses fail to prevent. They consist of measures taken to  
40 reduce the probability of (and to minimize the effects of) damage caused by  
41 hostile action. Examples include WMD/E force protection measures that  
42 reduce the vulnerability of U.S. force projection capabilities, homeland security  
43 civil defense measures (e.g., consequence management) that limit the potential  
44 damage done by WMD/E attacks, and critical infrastructure protection  
45 measures that make such infrastructure more resilient in the event of attack.

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1 The increasingly networked joint force of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will capitalize on  
2 passive defense effects achieved through widely dispersed forces. While still  
3 able to achieve operational objectives through their ability to more efficiently  
4 communicate, maneuver, and share a common operating picture, networked  
5 forces will present a decreasingly lucrative target for an adversary's WMD.  
6 However, because adversaries are more likely to use WME weapons (e.g., EMP)  
7 to attempt asymmetric defeat of technologically superior U.S. forces, improved  
8 weapons-effects hardening/survivability will be required for a broader range of  
9 joint force systems than required today. Effective interoperability and  
10 functional redundancy between joint force units (particularly in the areas of  
11 ISR and C2) will reduce the potential for single points of failure within complex  
12 systems and organizations, and ensure that critical C2 capabilities degrade  
13 gracefully. Information assurance for networked forces will ensure only trusted  
14 data are shared between users. Camouflage, concealment, and deception will  
15 increase in importance as adversaries become increasingly sophisticated users  
16 of widely available global information sources.

17  
18 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Both active and passive defenses clearly  
19 contribute to deterrence by denying benefits. Such defenses reduce an  
20 adversary's probability of achieving benefits from attacks (or threats of attacks)  
21 on the U.S., its forces, and its allies. When focused on reducing U.S.  
22 asymmetric vulnerabilities, such defenses enhance the benefit denial  
23 contributions of other force elements. Defenses have particularly important  
24 effects on adversaries' perceptions of the coercive political benefits they can  
25 derive from WMD/E capabilities. Active and passive defenses not only reduce  
26 the damage such capabilities can inflict--they also indicate U.S. willingness to  
27 invest in defenses to retain the freedom of action necessary to defend its vital  
28 interests.

29  
30 Contributions to Imposing Costs: When combined with U.S. force projection,  
31 Global Strike (described below), and nuclear capabilities, active and passive  
32 defenses have a synergistic effect on deterrence by imposing costs. By  
33 reducing U.S. vulnerability to a wide range of asymmetric attacks, defenses  
34 increase adversaries' perceived probability of incurring costs from U.S. military  
35 intervention, and from American preemptive or retaliatory attack on key assets.  
36 In other words, effective active and passive defense powerfully influence an  
37 adversary's perception of the likelihood of their aggression or coercion eliciting  
38 an extremely costly American military response.

39  
40 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Active and passive defenses  
41 have little or no ability to induce adversary restraint. In fact, because they  
42 have the synergistic impact on deterrence by imposing costs described above,  
43 they have the potential to increase adversary concerns regarding preemption.  
44 Such concerns, in certain circumstances, could escalate an adversary's  
45 consequences of restraint. Joint strategic deterrence planning and operations  
46 need to account for this possibility.

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**Global Strike**

Global Strike is the ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration and extended-range attacks to achieve precision effects against highly valued adversary assets. Effects-based targeting, analysis, planning, and execution are combined to support attacks on high-payoff/high-value targets. These targets may include WMD production, storage, and delivery systems, adversary decision-makers, critical command and control facilities, and various adversary leadership power bases. U.S. leadership could use Global Strike capabilities both to impose costs and to deny benefits to an adversary in a highly customized manner appropriate to the future security environment. Global Strike capabilities must be capable of defeating anti-access strategies imposed by distance, physical hardening or active and passive defenses and be able to operate in an environment where friendly forces may not have battlefield dominance. Because of the potentially urgent employment timelines, Global Strike will primarily rely upon long-range, high-speed, kinetic (advanced conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic aerospace delivery platforms, unmanned systems, cyber systems, and/or small numbers of special operations forces employed over extended distances. In-theater capabilities will supplement these forces if available and appropriate, but the defining characteristic of Global Strike will be its unique blend of “high-end” and “low-end” military capabilities without resort to large numbers of general purpose forces traditionally associated with major combat operations.

Global Strike normally will be conducted with an abbreviated logistics footprint and have limited objectives and rapid execution timelines (minutes to hours). Because adversaries will continue to pursue anti-access strategies, Global Strike must allow for independent operations anywhere in the world with minimal, if any, support from overseas forces and facilities. In many cases, senior national leadership will want to delay a Global Strike execution decision until the last possible minute. Future Global Strike missions will use weapons possessing two-way secure communications that allow for real-time command, targeting, retargeting, disarm, and disablement from the time of weapons release through impact/detonation. Since most Global Strike targets will be well protected, future forces must leverage stealth, speed, and low probability of intercept (e.g., ballistic) attack profiles to ensure arrival on target.

Threatened use of Global Strike will be more effective to the degree that both U.S. and adversary leaders are confident effects can be achieved without inflicting significant collateral damage. Our ability to create only intended strategic effects raises the credibility of strategic deterrence. Effects can be achieved through either kinetic or non-kinetic means, and may be massive or limited depending upon specific objectives, although the number of forces involved will be substantially less than those involved in major combat operations. In some cases, rapid execution against fleeting, “time-sensitive

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1 targets” will be needed to create desired effects against high-value targets such  
2 as mobile missile launchers or adversary decision-maker convoys.

3  
4 Because many Global Strike scenarios involve threatened (or actual)  
5 preemptive attacks on very-high value targets that will only be exposed for brief  
6 periods, Global Strike capabilities must also be highly reliable. Single-string  
7 operations lacking the redundancy commonly associated with traditional  
8 military operations will be common. The Global Strike philosophy will be “one  
9 shot equals one kill.” Simultaneous attacks against all the major targets in a  
10 given category, e.g., all division headquarters, all WMD facilities, may be  
11 required against more capable adversaries, although the total scope of  
12 operations will remain dramatically less than those associated with major  
13 combat.

14  
15 Key elements of Global Strike capabilities should be periodically demonstrated  
16 openly on the world stage--to ensure adversaries fully comprehend the credible  
17 threats they face. However, in all scenarios, it will be highly desirable to  
18 conduct strike operations without alerting in advance the adversary, who, if  
19 warned, might employ certain capabilities (e.g., WMD) rather than lose them. A  
20 “black” or covert component within an otherwise highly visible Global Strike  
21 capability is highly desirable. This capability could assure allies without  
22 provoking an adversary. If subsequently revealed, this capability will serve to  
23 deter third parties by reminding them of their inability to fully characterize the  
24 United States’ capability to wage war.

25  
26 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Global strike capabilities contribute to  
27 denying benefits by providing the U.S. national leadership with credible and  
28 effective preemption and response options in the event of impending (or  
29 ongoing) adversary aggression or coercion. These capabilities can either  
30 supplement or supplant force projection options under a wide variety of  
31 circumstances, including strategic surprise, adversary WMD or other  
32 asymmetric attacks on theater forces and allies, and rapidly developing threats.  
33 The ability to rapidly and precisely bring decisive strike forces to bear around  
34 the world significantly reduces adversary temptations to conduct asymmetric  
35 operations aimed at countering U.S. or allied theater capabilities.

36  
37 Contributions to Imposing costs: The ability to rapidly and precisely  
38 accomplish Global Strike operations also serves to convince potential  
39 adversaries that the costs of aggression or coercion are likely to be severe.  
40 Global Strike capabilities could provide options to rapidly escalate attacks on  
41 strategic centers of gravity without lengthy preparatory theater operations. A  
42 glimpse of our eventual capabilities in this area was provided by long-range  
43 bomber operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, though the  
44 timelines for initiating and completing such operations in the future will be far  
45 shorter, facilitated in part by innovative command relationships and planning  
46 improvements.

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1  
2 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: The ability to conduct  
3 “strategic” preemption or response to adversary aggression/coercion (without  
4 reliance on large scale, forward deployed theater forces) could have important  
5 impacts to inducing adversary restraint. Global Strike capabilities may not be  
6 perceived as posing the same kind of regime destruction threat that major  
7 theater combat operations present. Under certain circumstances, this could be  
8 critically important to strategic deterrence success.  
9

10 **Strategic Deterrence Information Operations**

11  
12 This capability takes two forms. The first is information operations designed to  
13 indirectly influence adversaries’ perceptions of U.S. intent, political will or  
14 resolve, and non-information operations capabilities. The second is  
15 information operations that shape adversaries’ perceptions directly through  
16 their potential or actual operational impact (e.g., electronic warfare). Both  
17 forms of strategic deterrence information operations are a subset of all national  
18 strategic information operations.<sup>13</sup> There may be a high degree of coordination  
19 required among the military, other US Government (USG) departments and  
20 agencies, and allies/coalition partners to achieve these objectives.  
21

22 Successful strategic deterrence information operations of the first type will  
23 reliably communicate to adversary decision-makers the information necessary  
24 to deter. This includes the ability to inform adversaries explicitly of U.S.  
25 national interests and intentions, communicate our confidence in our ability to  
26 limit damage to ourselves and our allies, reveal their vulnerability to U.S.  
27 attack through a wide range of capabilities, provide terms and conditions for  
28 adversary compliance, and influence other elites or centers of power to  
29 undermine adversary decision-makers, if required. Successful information  
30 operations must leverage the full range of communications means available  
31 today and in the future, and allow for both one- and two-way communications  
32 with adversary decision-makers at a variety of levels. Examples include  
33 television/radio broadcasts, email, text messaging, voice, leaflet drops, and  
34 other direct/indirect lines and means of communication yet to be developed.  
35 Because deterrence is about influencing adversary decision making, the ability  
36 to efficiently and effectively communicate in the adversary’s native language is  
37 imperative.  
38

39 The operational role of deterrence information operations focuses on  
40 psychological operations, computer network operations, deception, and  
41 electronic warfare capabilities that can affect adversary morale and unit  
42 cohesion, decision superiority, lines of communication (LOCs), logistics,

---

<sup>13</sup> Defined as “the spectrum of activities directed by POTUS and SECDEF to achieve national objectives by influencing or affecting all elements (political, military, economic, or informational) of an adversary’s or potential adversary’s national power and perceptions, while protecting similar friendly elements.”

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1 command and control (C2), and other key adversary functions.  
2 Simultaneously, it is essential that we are able to protect similar friendly  
3 capabilities and activities through advanced network security, information  
4 assurance and OPSEC capabilities. Continued advances in these areas  
5 enhance strategic deterrence greatly, as they have the potential to affect how  
6 an adversary perceives the potential benefits and costs of actions we seek to  
7 deter.

8 Contributions to Denying Benefits: Strategic deterrence information operations  
9 that communicate U.S. and allied/coalition capabilities and deny an adversary  
10 the benefits of aggression or coercion can take many forms. They range from  
11 efforts to convince adversaries the U.S. stake in a crisis or conflict is high, to  
12 the publicizing of military exercises and weapons tests that demonstrate U.S.  
13 and allied capabilities to defeat an adversary attack. Operational information  
14 operations, such as Computer Network Attack and Defense (CNA and CND) can  
15 also undermine an adversary's confidence in his ability to use force to his  
16 advantage. For example, CND capabilities that convince an adversary his  
17 attacks on U.S. computer-based networks will likely fail could significantly  
18 enhance deterrence in some scenarios.

19  
20 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Strategic deterrence information operations  
21 can favorably influence an adversary's perception of the costs he may incur in  
22 a wide variety of ways. For example, they can be designed to convince an  
23 adversary that U.S. will to intervene (and resolve to persevere) in the face of  
24 escalation is high; that the U.S. is likely to escalate its war aims in response to  
25 certain adversary actions; that the U.S. is willing to use nuclear weapons under  
26 certain circumstances, etc. In its more operational form, computer network  
27 attack and electronic warfare capabilities convince adversaries the U.S. can  
28 rapidly suppress air defenses, disrupt or terminate command and control,  
29 disrupt or damage vital production, etc. Finally, computer network defense  
30 capabilities can enhance an adversary's cost perceptions by protecting U.S.  
31 strike warfare capabilities against asymmetric attack, thereby enhancing the  
32 credibility of U.S. preemption/retaliation/escalation by limiting the damage an  
33 adversary can achieve.

34  
35 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: The contributions of strategic  
36 deterrence information operations to inducing adversary restraint are covered  
37 in the below section on inducement operations.

### 38 39 **Inducement Operations<sup>14</sup>**

40  
41 For strategic deterrence, the JFC has a limited number of means available to  
42 influence or mitigate an adversary's consequences of restraint. These options

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<sup>14</sup> Many potential inducement operations are, in a sense, a subset of broader strategic deterrence information operations (with the narrowly focused aim of inducing adversary restraint).

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1 are almost exclusively limited to nation-states and are not generally intended  
2 for non-state actors. Diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of  
3 power can effectively assure allies and dissuade adversaries and non-  
4 committed states. Several of these means could also extend to strategic  
5 deterrence.

6  
7 For example, shared early warning of aerospace and WMD attack can be used  
8 to improve an adversary's (or potential adversary's) situational awareness.  
9 Although perhaps counterintuitive, the deliberate dissemination of accurate  
10 information by the U.S. will reduce the likelihood of an unconsidered (or  
11 inappropriate) adversary reaction to U.S. or third-party activity. Information  
12 systems processing shared early warning must allow ad hoc warning networks  
13 to be seamlessly created and modified based on the current situation. Data  
14 must be presented in a manner understandable to diverse cultures. Finally,  
15 the U.S. must maintain the ability to add or delete membership from warning  
16 networks under changing circumstances while protecting U.S. information  
17 networks from adversary attack or exploitation.

18  
19 The JFC must be prepared to respond to an adversary's decision to forgo WMD  
20 ownership in response to U.S. strategic deterrence efforts. The JFC must be  
21 ready to assist in securing WMD storage sites and participate in  
22 dewatering or agent neutralization activities. These activities may occur  
23 in uncertain environments and may require transporting WMD to more secure  
24 locations, possibly under international inspection regimes. These activities  
25 enhance deterrence by providing the adversary with an alternative that, if  
26 presented properly in concert with the other instruments of national power,  
27 may enhance the adversary decision-maker's prestige at home or in  
28 international venues.

29  
30 The JFC may conduct or facilitate strategic information operations (to achieve  
31 influence and induce adversary restraint) in the form of direct monetary  
32 compensation or other kinds of support to individuals or groups within  
33 adversary decision-making centers--if such actions can reasonably be expected  
34 to enhance strategic deterrence. Support must be deliverable by overt and  
35 covert means, as appropriate, consistent with the JFC's objectives, national  
36 policy, and international/third-party considerations. These activities aim to  
37 shape the decision calculus of second-tier adversary influence groups,  
38 particularly those deeper in the military chain of command that implement  
39 senior-level directives or orders.

40  
41 Particularly in instances where the U.S. has limited objectives, the JFC needs  
42 to be able to conduct military operations in a manner that makes U.S. restraint  
43 and intent as clear as possible to the adversary. Adversary decision-makers  
44 must comprehend that the joint force could be doing more harm to him than is  
45 taking place, and those operations currently ongoing are not simply a

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1 precursor to broader operations with more ambitious objectives. Techniques to  
2 accomplish these goals are discussed in the Stability Operations JOC.

3  
4 To enable each of these efforts, the JFC requires robust lines of  
5 communications (more capable than those available today) with potential  
6 adversaries. Inducement operations most often require a detailed street  
7 address and knowledge of the occupant's whereabouts, not just "to whom it  
8 may concern." Methods of communication may be one-way, two-way, and/or  
9 multi-party and must allow for secure, rapid, and unambiguous transfer of  
10 information in crisis and non-crisis environments. Textual, visual, voice, and  
11 data communications will be required, as well as safe passage of personnel and  
12 material in some instances. Communications media must accommodate widely  
13 varying cultural norms and diverse situations. Flexibility will be the key to  
14 success in this area.

15  
16 Contributions to Denying benefits: Not applicable

17  
18 Contributions to Imposing costs: Not applicable

19  
20 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Inducement operations  
21 contribute to inducing adversary restraint by directly reducing the unwanted  
22 deleterious effects of U.S. actions on adversary decision-makers. Inducement  
23 operations can also improve an adversary's decision-making capability by  
24 providing better information on which to base decisions. Additionally, by  
25 separating second-tier leadership, inducement operations can undermine  
26 critical adversary activities and adversary leadership's corresponding bases of  
27 power.

## 28 29 **Space Control**

30  
31 America's national security and economic well-being are increasingly  
32 dependent on activities conducted in space. For instance, the US military is  
33 increasingly reliant on very precise air-delivered munitions guided by space-  
34 based assets such as GPS. In the 12 years between Operation Desert Storm  
35 and Operation Iraqi Freedom, new concepts of operations leveraged improved  
36 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (made possible by space  
37 systems) along with cheaper precision guided munitions. These concepts of  
38 operations enable more effective military operations by improving logistics  
39 efficiencies, reducing manpower requirements, and placing smaller numbers of  
40 U.S. troops under the threat of battlefield attack.

41  
42 The greatest shift in commercial space activity over the last decade has been  
43 the global proliferation of enterprises providing space system services that rival  
44 those of the U.S. Commercial investment in space services today is roughly  
45 \$100 billion and will grow considerably by 2015. Once available only to the  
46 senior leaders of industrialized nation-states, all state and non-state actors are

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1 now (and will be increasingly so by 2015) “space capable” due to commercially  
2 available space products and services. These products and services include:  
3 high-bandwidth satellite communications, high-resolution imagery of the  
4 earth’s surface, precise navigation and timing signals, near real-time  
5 environmental hazard data, Internet-based space surveillance data, and the  
6 ability to move information as rapidly and as securely as U.S. forces. The  
7 growing availability of space services data marketed over global networks will  
8 make it difficult to determine exactly who is exploiting space services for  
9 potential hostile actions against the U.S., its allies, and friends. The global free  
10 market economy and the democratization of information will fuel commercial  
11 space technology development, as well as provide an opportunity for  
12 adversaries to disrupt these services and threaten our standard of living.  
13

14 In many ways, the growing role of space to U.S. and international security is  
15 analogous to the role of the high seas since the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The ability of the  
16 United States to access and use space, and to deny such access and utilization  
17 to adversaries if necessary, is a vital national security interest directly  
18 impacting strategic deterrence. Potential adversaries will target U.S., allied,  
19 and commercial space assets to counter or reduce U.S. military operational  
20 effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic and societal stability, and  
21 national will. A credible adversary capability against space systems decreases  
22 our overall strategic deterrence posture unless we can respond to these  
23 threats.  
24

25 Space control is defined as operations to ensure freedom of action in space for  
26 the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom  
27 of action in space. Because space systems rely upon space, terrestrial, link,  
28 and user segments to achieve their effectiveness, space control operations may  
29 take place in any of the operational domains of land, sea, air, space, and  
30 information. Applicable space control tasks include: space situational  
31 awareness; protection of U.S. and friendly space systems; prevention of  
32 adversary use of space systems and services; and negation of space systems  
33 and services used for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests. More  
34 broadly, space control must also provide for assured U.S. access to the space  
35 environment. The JFC must accomplish space control activities consistent  
36 with U.S. obligations under international law and pursuant with national  
37 policy.  
38

39 By 2015, space control will be most greatly enhanced by the joint force’s ability  
40 to use space systems in a highly-networked, peer-to-peer manner--to deny an  
41 adversary the easy means of holding critical U.S. space system link, user,  
42 terrestrial, or space segments at risk. This approach (for capabilities, systems,  
43 and forces alike) is best characterized as one of “integrated, assured defense”  
44 where the U.S. can see first, understand first, and act first. This will be  
45 accomplished by proliferating, networking, protecting and integrating each of  
46 these segments in a manner previously considered unachievable. The

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1 combination of low-cost production combined with miniaturization and shared  
2 understanding will enable both response and denial options for strategic  
3 deterrence.

4  
5 Space systems will incorporate improved protection measures throughout the  
6 space, terrestrial, link, and user segments. These measures may include:  
7 ground facility protection (hardening/dispersal of systems and facilities;  
8 security; covert facilities; camouflage, concealment, and deception; mobility),  
9 alternate nodes, spare satellites, link encryption, increased signal strength,  
10 adaptable waveforms, satellite radiation hardening, on-board environmental  
11 sensors, redundant architectures, and space debris protection measures.  
12 Protection measures must provide unambiguous indications of whether a failed  
13 satellite was deliberately attacked, suffered a natural environmental failure, or  
14 experienced an onboard anomaly (either operator induced, latent, or  
15 subtle/dispersed attack).

16  
17 Satellite design will migrate toward small, single-purpose, distributed  
18 constellations providing continuous earth coverage. This will deny an  
19 adversary the ability to easily target a small number of critical nodes and  
20 create a much-needed measure of defensive redundancy. Command and  
21 control of these constellations will rely heavily on automated machine-to-  
22 machine interfaces. Terrestrial ground support infrastructure will not be  
23 stovepiped by specific mission area (i.e., ISR, PNT, communications, etc.) but  
24 instead will service a variety of functions in a scalable, tailorable fashion. This  
25 support infrastructure will rely more heavily on camouflage, concealment, and  
26 deception than today, and will widely migrate across the joint force to include  
27 deployed forces in-theater.

28  
29 To populate, replenish, and rapidly reconstitute these constellations, low-cost  
30 responsive spacelift is essential. This capability will allow the U.S. to respond  
31 to an adversary WME attack by rapidly reconstituting systems destroyed or  
32 degraded by enemy action. Responsive spacelift requires mobility and  
33 proliferation that reduces an adversary's opportunity to target systems while in  
34 preparation for launch. Modular, production-line methods that allow for "mass  
35 customization" of satellites, launch systems, terrestrial C2 and user segments  
36 are required. To achieve economies of scale and increase flexibility and  
37 robustness, the same components, infrastructure, and joint force operational  
38 procedures that enable long-range Global Strike capabilities should be  
39 considered for their potential dual-use application for responsive spacelift.

40  
41 Space situational awareness, a subset of global situational awareness, will be  
42 achieved through the integration of land, air, sea, space, and information  
43 systems deployed worldwide. This includes legacy joint force capabilities not  
44 previously considered in the context of space situational awareness (such as  
45 airborne or shipborne radars) or new expeditionary systems (such as low-cost,  
46 mobile optical telescopes) in direct support of fielded forces. The global

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1 distribution and proliferation of sensors, combined with full-spectrum  
2 integration and information fusion, will enhance space situational awareness  
3 and enable the JFC to take effective denial and response actions to counter  
4 adversaries.

5  
6 Denying enemy freedom of action in space is accomplished through prevention  
7 (primarily non-military means) and negation (military actions). Prevention  
8 capabilities include elements of the diplomatic, informational, and economic  
9 instruments of national power. Negation consists of five elements: deception,  
10 disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction. Deception consists of those  
11 measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or  
12 falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to  
13 their interests. Disruption is the temporary impairment (diminished value or  
14 strength) of the utility of space systems, usually without physical damage to  
15 the space system. These operations include the delaying of critical, perishable  
16 operational data to an adversary. Denial is the temporary elimination (total  
17 removal) of the utility of the space system, usually by stopping access to a  
18 system without creating any physical damage. This objective can be  
19 accomplished by such measures as denying electrical power to the space  
20 terrestrial nodes or computer centers where data and information are  
21 processed and stored. Degradation is the permanent impairment of the utility  
22 of space systems, usually with physical damage. This option includes attacks  
23 against terrestrial nodes and capabilities. It may also include the use of  
24 information operations. Destruction is the permanent elimination of the utility  
25 of space systems. This last option includes any means to interdict critical  
26 terrestrial nodes; use of attacks to destroy uplink/downlink facilities, electrical  
27 power stations, and telecommunications facilities; and attacks against space  
28 segments themselves.

29  
30 For a variety of reasons, the JFC will generally approach these space control  
31 negation options in ascending order. The wide and increasing existence of  
32 multinational space system ventures (involving a host of state and non-state  
33 actors) creates the need to limit collateral damage to the greatest extent  
34 possible. Additionally, the JFC must minimize hazards to navigation created  
35 by space debris that impacts all spacefaring activity. Finally, strategic  
36 deterrence is enhanced both by the ability to achieve precision effects  
37 (enhancing credibility) as well as providing the option to escalate conflict  
38 should an adversary take COAs counter to U.S. vital interests.

39  
40 The joint force in 2015 will use a variety of techniques to achieve desired  
41 negation effects. These will include reversible effects (such as jamming,  
42 dazzling, or data corruption) that allow for space systems to be disrupted or  
43 denied during conflict but remain viable subsequent to conflict resolution.  
44 These effects must also be scalable to threaten an adversary with degradation  
45 or destruction. Adversary decision-makers must perceive they cannot credibly

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1 pursue COAs (such as “hiding behind” third-party systems) without the U.S.  
2 imposing unacceptable costs or denying them intended benefits.

3  
4 Contributions to Denying Benefits: U.S. space control capabilities play an  
5 increasingly important role in convincing adversaries that the benefits they  
6 seek through aggression or coercion cannot be achieved. By denying  
7 adversaries access to space as a means of surveillance, command and control,  
8 precision weapon guidance, etc., space control capabilities severely constrain  
9 adversary military options across a wide range of operations and courses of  
10 action. Space control capabilities also assure U.S. access to space, further  
11 undermining an adversary’s belief that they will benefit through aggression or  
12 coercion by reducing their probability of achieving surprise. Space control  
13 facilitates (and networked joint force operations enhance) the global situational  
14 awareness needed to counter adversary attacks, and (in some cases)  
15 compensates for the loss of allied/coalition support. Access to space has  
16 become so important to U.S. military operations that effective space control is  
17 itself a benefit denial mechanism, denying the adversary the benefits  
18 associated with disrupting or denying U.S. space access.

19  
20 Contributions to Imposing Costs: Because space-based capabilities provide a  
21 wide range of enabling functions for Global Strike and force projection  
22 operations, space control significantly enhances the costs the U.S. can impose  
23 on an adversary. For example, global situational awareness/ISR are critical to  
24 effective targeting of key adversary assets, especially in the face of increasingly  
25 sophisticated denial and deception techniques. Global space-based C2  
26 capabilities enable the conduct of Global Strike operations and enhance the  
27 conduct of theater strike and force projection operations. Finally, U.S. space  
28 control capabilities offer the prospect of imposing costs directly by denying an  
29 adversary access to, or destroying, their military or commercial space assets.

30  
31 Contributions to Inducing Adversary Restraint: Space control capabilities play  
32 little, if any, direct role in inducing adversary restraint. However, the  
33 information or services provided by space systems (e.g., shared early warning,  
34 remote sensing, etc.) may directly contribute to inducing adversary restraint.  
35 U.S. space control planning must fully account for these impacts to avoid  
36 unintended adversary aggression or escalation.

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**Applicability of Means to State vs. Non-State Actors<sup>15</sup>**

Figure 2 illustrates the applicability of enabling and direct means when considering state and non-state adversaries<sup>16</sup>. Joint force planners should consider the applicability of particular means when crafting specific strategic deterrence efforts.

Tgt Audiences →  Means ↓	<u>State Actors:</u>	<u>Non-State Actors:</u>
<b>Cost Imposition</b>	All capabilities except Inducement Ops.	All capabilities except Inducement Ops.
<b>Benefit Denial</b>	All capabilities except Inducement Ops.	All capabilities except Inducement Ops.
<b>Induce Adversary Restraint: (3 below)</b>	<u>State Actors:</u>	<u>Non-State Actors:</u>
<b>Incentives</b>	Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2	Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2
<b>Exploit Adversary Leadership Seams</b>	Force Projection, Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2	Allied/coalition Military Cooperation & Integration, Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2
<b>Improve Adversary Sit. Awareness and/or Exercise U.S. Operational Restraint</b>	Force Projection, Global Strike, Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2, Allied/coalition Military Cooperation & Integration	Inducement Ops, Global Situation Awareness, C2

9  
10

Figure 2: Enabling/Direct Means Applicability

<sup>15</sup> A recommended area for follow-on SD JOC development is the interaction between state and non-state actors, as well as identifying the impact of failed states on strategic deterrence implementation efforts.

<sup>16</sup> Non-state actors are defined as organizations or individuals capable of significant international aggression who do not take official direction from government decision-makers of a nation-state.

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1  
2 **METRICS AND EXPERIMENTATION**  
3

4 In order to evaluate and improve the SD JOC, techniques and metrics will be  
5 developed to assess alternative deterrence strategies, postures, and courses of  
6 action. However, the focus of the SD JOC is ultimately on influencing  
7 adversary decision-making. Because the inner workings of an adversary's  
8 mind are not readily amenable to external measurement the assessment of  
9 strategic deterrence operations is inherently subjective. Developing metrics for  
10 deterrence evaluation is further complicated by the fact that deterrence success  
11 is marked by adversary inaction, a "result" which may or may not be  
12 attributable to U.S. deterrence efforts (the so-called "paradox of deterrence").  
13

14 Deterrence assessment metrics need to focus on measuring the relative impact  
15 of U.S. deterrent capabilities and actions on the key variables in a given  
16 adversary's decision calculus. While it is virtually impossible to identify with  
17 confidence the "threshold values" of these key variables (i.e., the net valuation  
18 of perceived benefits, costs, and consequences of restraint or inaction at which  
19 deterrence will fail), a rigorous comparative assessment of how effective  
20 alternative U.S. deterrent approaches can be is within our reach.  
21

22 A deterrence effectiveness assessment requires a two-part process. The first  
23 step is Adversary Decision Calculus Assessment. The second step is  
24 Deterrence Impact Assessment. This two-part process can be repeated, using  
25 alternative adversaries and scenarios, to build a deterrence effectiveness  
26 database that facilitates identification and prioritization of high-leverage  
27 strategic deterrence capabilities, attributes, and operations. Both steps may  
28 include effects of (or observations from) efforts to assure or dissuade which are  
29 applicable to the scenario and/or region.  
30

31 **Adversary Decision Calculus Assessment**  
32

33 Deterrence effectiveness assessment is inherently adversary specific and  
34 scenario dependent. This is because it is based first and foremost on how an  
35 adversary perceives the benefits, costs, and consequences of restraint or  
36 inaction of a course of action the JFC seeks to deter. The first step in  
37 evaluating the deterrence effectiveness of alternative joint deterrence operations  
38 is to rigorously assess the content of a subject adversary's decision calculus in  
39 a scenario of interest. This decision calculus assessment will focus on  
40 identifying the key variables that constitute the adversary's decision calculus  
41 and their perceived values and probabilities. The assessment must also  
42 address how those variables may shift over time. This will require significant  
43 intelligence community and other Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement, to  
44 provide an in-depth understanding of adversary perceptions (rather than  
45 "objective reality," which is less important for achieving effective strategic  
46 deterrence). The focus of this adversary decision calculus assessment will be

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1 on identifying both the key variables U.S. deterrence efforts should seek to  
2 influence favorably, and the critical factors that decisively influence the  
3 adversary's perceptions of those key variables.

### 4 5 **Deterrence Impact Assessment**

6  
7 The second process step is to assess the deterrent impact of alternative U.S.  
8 deterrence operations, activities, and capabilities (and associated attributes) on  
9 the adversary decision calculus assessed in the first step. The focus of this  
10 effort is to answer two central questions. If the United States has X capabilities  
11 or conducts Y operations and activities:

12  
13 A. How much deterrent impact will result on which variables in the  
14 adversary's decision calculus?

15  
16 B. What impacts will there be on 3<sup>rd</sup> parties of interest to the U.S.?

17  
18 The answer to Question A will identify potentially high-leverage deterrent  
19 actions and capabilities for the JFC to conduct and employ. It should also  
20 provide important insights into how and why those high-leverage actions and  
21 capabilities have the deterrent impacts sought, helping the JFC tailor their use  
22 for maximum deterrent effect. This analysis should also explicitly aim at  
23 identifying potential unintended consequences of specific deterrent actions and  
24 capabilities, aiding in the avoidance of inadvertently undermining strategic  
25 deterrence.

26  
27 The answers to Question B should focus on two critical issues. First, what  
28 impacts exist that are relevant to deterring 3<sup>rd</sup> parties from intervening in the  
29 scenario of interest? Second, what impacts on potential future scenarios  
30 involving key 3<sup>rd</sup> parties will result from strategic deterrence operations in the  
31 scenario of interest? In other words, what lessons might key 3<sup>rd</sup> parties  
32 (potential future adversaries) learn that will shape their own decision calculus  
33 in future scenarios involving the United States?

### 34 35 **Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab**

36  
37 Effective implementation of this approach to metrics and experimentation will  
38 require a dedicated, long-term assessment effort. Establishment of a "Strategic  
39 Deterrence Assessment Lab" would focus DOD activities and create a national  
40 asset for strategic deterrence effectiveness assessment. This would aid in the  
41 continued development of strategic deterrence joint operating concepts and  
42 strategies. The results of these assessments would be folded into JFC  
43 deliberate planning and support rapid development of suggested courses of  
44 action in crisis action planning.

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**SUMMARY AND CHALLENGES**

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The dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century brought the advent of multiple, diverse, and difficult strategic deterrence challenges for the United States. Some observers contend these challenges are so difficult they put in question the relevance of deterrence to our security policy and posture. The techniques of deterrence are not obsolete, however. Strategic deterrence will continue to be a critical element of an overarching American national security strategy--a first (but by no means last) line of defense against adversaries that threaten our vital interests or our national survival.

Our national approach to strategic deterrence, including this DOD concept for conducting strategic deterrence operations, must adapt to meet the changes of the 21st Century. As highlighted in this document, such adaptation will (in some instances) require new or enhanced capabilities. Our understanding of how deterrence works must undoubtedly mature beyond our previous concepts.

Deterrence is ultimately in the eye of the beholder: the adversary. Adversary perceptions are the focus of all our strategic deterrence efforts. As a result, effective strategic deterrence involves far more than just DOD capabilities, operations, and activities. Rather, it demands a national level effort involving extensive interagency (and in some cases, intra-alliance) integration and coordination. Our future strategic deterrence success will be a function of how well we bring all our capabilities and resources to bear to achieve decisive influence over adversary decision-making. This Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept offers a description of how we envision the DOD role in achieving this success.

In summary, this joint operating concept outlines a new approach to understanding the “ways” and “means” necessary to achieve the “end” of strategic deterrence. It focuses strategic deterrence on the appropriate Center of Gravity: the adversary’s decision calculus. It describes how adversary decision-making can be decisively influenced through denying benefits, imposing costs, and inducing adversary restraint. It identifies a set of capabilities and associated attributes required to achieve decisive influence. Finally it proposes a means of evaluating the effectiveness of alternative joint strategic deterrence options, making future experimentation and further concept development possible. The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept Version 1.0 is the first step in improving our understanding of deterrence as applied to the security challenges of the opening decades of the 21st Century.

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### Glossary

1		
2		
3	AOR	area of responsibility
4	C2	command and control
5	C4I	command, control, communications, computers
6		and intelligence
7	CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
8		and/or high-yield explosive
9	CJCSI	Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
10	CNA	computer network attack
11	CND	computer network defense
12	COA	course(s) of action
13	CIP	critical infrastructure protection
14	DE	directed energy
15	DOD	Department of Defense
16	DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
17		leadership and education, personnel and
18		facilities
19	EMP	electromagnetic pulse
20	HERF	high energy radio frequency
21	HQ	headquarters
22	ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
23	JCDE	joint concept development and experimentation
24	JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
25	JFC	joint force commander
26	JOC	joint operating concept
27	JOpsC	joint operations concepts
28	JP	joint publication
29	JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
30	JTF	joint task force
31	JWCA	Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment
32	LOC	lines of communication
33	MCO	major combat operation
34	NMS	national military strategy
35	NSS	national security strategy
36	OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
37	PNT	positional navigation timing
38	POTUS	President of the United States
39	QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
40	ROMO	range of military operations
41	SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
42	SD	strategic deterrence
43	SME	subject matter expert
44	UCP	unified command plan
45	WMD	weapons of mass destruction
46	WME	weapons of mass effect
47		

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1  
2 **Appendix A: Illustrative Example for Strategic Deterrence**  
3

4 The following illustrative example explores strategic deterrence challenges the JFC  
5 must consider in the timeframe covered by this JOC (present-day to 2015). The  
6 unprecedented degree of global joint force collaboration required shows why no  
7 single regional or functional commander can approach deterrence actions  
8 independently. Strategic deterrence must be integrated across regions,  
9 organizations, DOD activities, and be considered in the context of other defense  
10 policy goals and instruments of national power.

11  
12 The scenario starts with detection of a terrorist conversation (Adversary X)  
13 discussing plans to rapidly procure a portfolio of capabilities (computer network  
14 attack, WMD, ballistic and cruise missiles) aimed at inflicting mass casualties and  
15 economic disruption within U.S. borders. The conversation is traced to one  
16 specific country in a regional combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR)  
17 (AOR [A]). In another country/AOR (B), apparently unrelated activities by rogue  
18 nation-state actors (Adversary Y) to sell highly-prized capabilities/weapon(s) are  
19 detected by human intelligence sources and corroborated by persistent  
20 surveillance (national technical means). Effective global situational awareness  
21 (specifically in this case, automated database mining conducted against standing  
22 requests for information) allows these events to be identified and correlated.  
23 Combatant commanders, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, defense agencies,  
24 and other essential federal organizations collaboratively determine the next  
25 sequence of required events. This includes decisions on what, if any, additional  
26 global ISR assets, capabilities, or legal authorization is needed to develop a better  
27 understanding of this possible threat. Decision-support tools and common  
28 operating pictures incorporating strategic deterrence intelligence enhance the  
29 commander's battlespace awareness, highlight "possible emerging" crises early,  
30 and show/predict interrelationships with not only potential adversaries, but also  
31 allies and non-committed actors.

32  
33 Information from additional sources is received [that by itself, due to sources and  
34 collection methods, would not stand alone] indicating that efforts to lease a cargo  
35 ship through a third party, in a third AOR(C), are in progress. The individuals  
36 involved are using aliases and accounts linked to known terrorist profiles  
37 operating in AORs A and B. Similarly, federal homeland security agencies add yet  
38 another seemingly unrelated piece to the puzzle that provide indications and  
39 warning of a larger plan to attack critical infrastructure installations in the U.S.  
40 and Canada. These attacks are recognized by the U.S. as an opening prelude to  
41 Country Y's planned invasion of its neighbor (a U.S. ally) with the intent of  
42 undermining U.S. national resolve and diverting attention/resources towards the  
43 U.S. homeland. Specific attacks planned by Adversary X include a biological  
44 weapon attack on a major U.S. metropolitan area, a radiological attack on a major  
45 U.S. seaport serving both commercial and military traffic, and a computer network

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1 attack aimed at the main satellite and fiber-optic telecommunications links  
2 connecting the U.S. to overseas financial markets.

3  
4 Adversary Y attempts to covertly move air, land, and sea forces towards the border  
5 of the U.S. ally. U.S. and allied persistent, intrusive ISR assets monitor these  
6 movements. Adversary Y is equipped with WMD and possesses both short-range  
7 delivery systems as well as a handful of long-range missiles capable of reaching  
8 the U.S. homeland. Adversary Y also operates a single optical remote sensing  
9 satellite that also provides meteorological data to third-party users when  
10 overflying their respective countries.

11  
12 At this time enough credible information is available that the CJCS informs senior  
13 national leadership on this emerging threat. All relevant elements of the joint  
14 force have already been alerted through robust collaborative networks. Effective  
15 interagency cooperation allows a range of options involving all instruments of  
16 national power to be presented to the President during initial strategy formulation.  
17 Since the perceived military threat involves 3-4 AORs and 4-5 different  
18 agencies/departments, the SECDEF tasks a single combatant commander to  
19 rapidly integrate and coordinate DOD global efforts supporting strategic  
20 deterrence. The resulting COAs are presented to the SECDEF by CJCS and  
21 integrated with other federal agency efforts to develop a range of crisis responses  
22 for the President. Aboard Air Force One, the President assembles (via secure video  
23 teleconferencing) the SECDEF, CJCS and combatant commanders. The President  
24 selects strategic deterrence COAs and directs their execution by the integrating  
25 combatant commander and supporting commanders. Strategic deterrence efforts  
26 are also integrated with DOD homeland defense and emergency preparedness  
27 activities as well as preparations for possible major combat operations in defense  
28 of the threatened ally.

29  
30 Strategic deterrence activities must be aimed at the decision calculus of both  
31 Adversary X and Adversary Y. The efforts aim to deter the following adversary  
32 COAs:

- 33  
34 ➤ Adversary X use of WMD/E against the U.S. homeland  
35 ➤ Adversary Y attack against our regional ally  
36 ➤ Adversary Y use of WMD on the theater battlefield  
37 ➤ Adversary Y use of WMD against the U.S. homeland  
38 ➤ Continued sanctuary/support of Adversary X within Country A

39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44 Potential military strategic deterrence actions by the U.S. could include:  
45

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- 1 ➤ Moving theater ballistic missile defenses to protect our ally from Adversary Y
- 2 (denying benefits)
- 3 ➤ Increasing the level of persistent, intrusive ISR visible to Adversary Y decision-
- 4 makers to improve our ability to respond to aggression and demonstrate
- 5 awareness of ongoing adversary actions (denying benefits)
- 6 ➤ Increase public visibility of U.S. declaratory policy regarding U.S. responses to
- 7 the use of WMD against the United States or its allies, to include the potential
- 8 use of all of our options. (denying benefits and imposing costs)
- 9 ➤ Alerting in-theater U.S. forces and preparing for embarkation, deployment, and
- 10 arrival of additional expeditionary U.S. forces (denying benefits and imposing
- 11 costs)
- 12 ➤ Conducting kinetic and/or non-kinetic Global Strike on transshipment
- 13 activities associated with Adversary X efforts to assemble and mate WMD and
- 14 associated delivery means (denying benefits)
- 15 ➤ Denying (but not degrading) Adversary Y's satellite with a laser dazzler so it
- 16 cannot be used to monitor U.S. force deployments in support of the regional
- 17 ally, yet still be available for legitimate third-party peaceful purposes (denying
- 18 benefits)
- 19 ➤ Conduct robust information operations against Adversary Y military personnel
- 20 responsible for WMD use, convincing them not to follow WMD employment
- 21 orders (inducing adversary restraint)
- 22 ➤ Conduct demonstration of long-range precision Global Strike capabilities as a
- 23 reminder of the joint force capability to credibly threaten adversary decision-
- 24 makers with destruction or to preempt fielded WMD delivery systems (imposing
- 25 costs/denying benefits)
- 26 ➤ In coordination with the other instruments of national power, conduct strategic
- 27 information operations to deter the WMD arms sale or ship leasing. (denying
- 28 benefits)
- 29 ➤ Conduct CNA to sabotage [e.g., discredit financial data] systems associated
- 30 with Adversary X's WMD acquisition activities and undermine their support
- 31 relationships with other third-party actors. (denying benefits)
- 32 ➤ Publicize CONUS exercise of joint force consequence management resources
- 33 and critical infrastructure protection in HLS support role (denying benefits)
- 34 ➤ Communicate to Adversary Y decision-makers the fact of U.S. knowledge of
- 35 support for Adversary X, as well as threaten to expand U.S. war aims should
- 36 open conflict occur (inducing adversary restraint)
- 37 In coordination with the other instruments of national power, conduct inducement
- 38 operations directed at stopping Country A's support of Adversary X (denying
- 39 benefits/inducing adversary restraint)
- 40
- 41 COAs would be collaboratively coordinated to include all combatant commanders
- 42 and defense agencies so that strategic deterrence actions in one AOR are
- 43 understood and planned for in all AORs.
- 44

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### **Appendix B: Information requirements for evaluating an adversary's decision calculus<sup>17</sup>**

**To deter an opponent, the JFC must exercise decisive influence over adversary decision-making regarding specific adversary courses of action that pose strategic threats. Answers to the following questions will help the JFC conduct his strategic deterrence mission:**

Does the JFC know who is being deterred?

Does the JFC know whether the potential adversary is capable of rational decision-making?

Do the adversary decision-makers targeted for deterrence actually control policy decisions and military actions? If so, to what degree?

Does the JFC understand (even approximately) the adversary's will or resolve in challenging the United States? Does the JFC know if there is sufficient softness in the adversary's determination such that particular U.S. capabilities can pose an effective deterrent?

Is the JFC sufficiently familiar with the adversary's decision-making process to be confident that it can be affected?

Can the JFC approximate or understand the decision-maker's value hierarchy and rationality?

Does the JFC know the types of capabilities that would dominate the potential adversary's decision-making and value hierarchy?

Does the JFC know the adversary decision-makers' value "thresholds" sufficiently well to avoid situations in which they are "undeterrable" for all practical purposes, or in which U.S. responses will serve to provoke rather than deter?

Can the JFC U.S. national leadership communicate reliably with the adversary?

Has the JFC identified key cultural or idiosyncratic factors and accommodated these considerations within the overall deterrence construct?

Does the JFC know the level of credibility likely to be ascribed by the potential adversary to U.S. capabilities?

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<sup>17</sup> Adapted from Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (University Press of Kentucky, 1996) p. 126-127.

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- 1
- 2 Does the JFC know what factors determine the United States' overall level of
- 3 credibility in the adversary's view, and can the JFC affect that level?
- 4

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### Appendix C: C2 Capabilities Required for Strategic Deterrence

**The success of the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept requires the development of a global C4 capability that is both agile and responsive, with capabilities for:**

- Secure, assured, survivable, and readily accessible, global command, control, and communications capability between and among the President, SECDEF, Combatant Commanders, DOD Agencies, interagency departments, selected allies, and assigned/augmenting forces
- Continuous access to relevant, all-source intelligence, displayed via a common (configurable) global operational picture that can be shared by all mission partners
- Collaboratively developed operations intelligence, Operations Plans (OPLANS), Contingency Plans (CONPLANS), and ISR campaign plans which are rapidly disseminated by Integrated Tasking Orders
- Assured access to, and communications with assigned engaged forces, sensors, intelligence, and analysis capabilities that foster rapid, collaborative planning, execution, and “real-time” re-tasking/re-targeting capabilities
- Collaboration in a multilevel secure environment with multiple partners using a common, relevant, configurable global operational picture. Because deterrence activities will require a tailored approach emphasizing “coalitions of the willing,” information provided in this environment must be configurable by individual partner with the ability to add or delete membership. Additionally, achieving successful strategic deterrence will require (in some cases) the ability to distribute this information directly to the targeted adversary to demonstrate the futility of attempting to challenge U.S. vital interests.
- Collection, fusion, and assessment of battle damage and effects-based assessment reports impacting strategic, operational, and tactical operations
- Collaborative integration with key DOD and USG agency capabilities and operations to leverage their unique expertise, synchronize respective efforts and avoid unintended consequences


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**Appendix D: Linkages Between Strategic Deterrence and Other Defense Policy Goals**

The Strategic Deterrence JOC outlines the ways a JFC will bring U.S. military capabilities to bear in deterring threats to U.S. vital interests under a wide variety of current and future circumstances. However, strategic deterrence is not “waged” in a vacuum. Rather, the U.S. constantly pursues other defense policy goals\* that have impacts on, and are impacted by, the goal of strategic deterrence. This appendix provides a high level overview of the nature of those impacts.



**Figure 1: Strategic Deterrence Impacts on other Defense Policy Goals**

\* The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the following four defense policy goals: 1) Assuring allies and friends; 2) Dissuading future military competition; 3) Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and, 4) If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary. For purposes of this document, Strategic Deterrence is considered to be the DoD contribution for achieving (3) above.

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### Deterrence Impacts on Assure, Dissuade, and Defeat (Figure 1)

**Assure.** Effective strategic deterrence has three primary impacts on the assurance of U.S. allies. Through political commitments to defend our allies, the strategic deterrent effect of U.S. capabilities is extended to our friends by assuring their security needs will be met. This central assurance impact of extended deterrence has two important secondary effects. First, allied perception that extended deterrence will be effective tends to ease the formation and maintenance of U.S.-led coalitions. Second, effective extended deterrence encourages allies to forgo indigenous development or procurement of duplicative military capabilities, thereby enhancing U.S. counterproliferation efforts.

**Dissuade.** Adversaries that perceive U.S. strategic deterrence efforts and operations as effective may also be dissuaded from militarily competing with us in certain areas. For example, if U.S. deterrence efforts are successful, some adversaries may view the acquisition or maintenance of certain threatening capabilities as superfluous and excessively expensive. As an example, effective ballistic missile defenses minimize an adversary's benefits and reduce incentives for acquiring ballistic missiles. Defenses also magnify an adversary's financial burdens, since the adversary that continues to pursue missile development must develop better (and more expensive) countermeasures when attempting to overcome defenses.


It should be noted that effective deterrence might not always have this effect. Some potentially threatening capabilities may still be attractive because an adversary believes they are essential to their own deterrence efforts aimed at the U.S. or at other regional competitors or adversaries. Effective strategic deterrence may even result in adversaries changing their policy vis-à-vis the U.S. and its allies, opting for a less hostile or competitive approach given the futility of military competition.

**Defeat.** Finally, effective strategic deterrence can powerfully enhance the pursuit of the "defeat" defense policy goal if necessary. First and foremost, deterring adversary use of WMD enables the U.S. to bring its overwhelming conventional supremacy to bear, thereby facilitating adversary compliance on U.S. terms. Deterrence of adversary coercion efforts against U.S. allies also can facilitate adversary defeat by strengthening U.S.-led coalitions and ensuring allied/coalition participation in (and support of) defeat-focused operations.

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**Figure 2: Impact of other Defense Policy Goals on Strategic Deterrence**

**Assure, Dissuade, Defeat Impacts on Strategic Deterrence (Figure 2)**

10 **Assure.** Successful assurance of U.S. allies has three key impacts on our  
11 strategic deterrence efforts. First, assured allies are resolute allies, particularly  
12 in the face of determined coercive actions by our adversaries. Increased  
13 coalition resolve in turn enhances deterrence by convincing adversaries that  
14 there is no indirect means of undermining U.S. involvement and prosecution of  
15 military operations. Second, assurance efforts also have the effect of  
16 convincing adversaries that the U.S. stake in the outcome of a conflict involving  
17 our allies is high. This enhances deterrence by increasing adversaries’  
18 perception of U.S. political will and determination. As an example, the forward  
19 basing of U.S. forces in areas of potential conflict raises the profile of U.S.  
20 interests while assuring allies at the same time. Finally, assured allies are far  
21 more likely to provide U.S. forces the basing and other support that enable the

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1 JFC to bring our full array of capabilities to bear in a timely and sustained  
2 manner.

3  
4 **Dissuade.** The deterrence impact of effective dissuasion efforts is derived  
5 primarily from a “shaping the strategic deterrence battlespace” effect.  
6 Adversaries that opt not to compete with us in certain areas of military  
7 capability indirectly enhance our own strategic deterrence by bolstering  
8 perceived U.S. credibility. Dissuasion preserves our military supremacy in  
9 areas critical to effective deterrence, and aids in convincing adversaries that we  
10 can and will deny them the benefits of contemplated aggression in the pre-  
11 crisis, day-to-day peacetime period.

12  
13 **Defeat.** The deterrence impacts of successfully achieving the “defeat” defense  
14 policy goal are too vast to describe in detail here. What is important to  
15 understand is that how and at what cost we successfully defeat one adversary  
16 will have critical impacts on our deterrence efforts vis-à-vis other adversaries.  
17 The JFC must take these potential impacts into account (and explicitly plan to  
18 exploit them) as we plan and conduct adversary defeat operations.  
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2 **Appendix E: Required Capabilities and Attributes for Strategic Deterrence**  
3

4 Joint operating concepts must include enough measurable detail to support  
5 experimentation, permit the development of measures of effectiveness, and  
6 allow decision-makers to assess and compare alternative ideas and make  
7 programmatic decisions. This appendix summarizes the required capabilities  
8 (and their associated attributes) described earlier in this document. The  
9 appendix is divided into five sections:

10  
11 Capabilities: Specific required capabilities (defined by CJCSI 3170.01C as "the  
12 ability to execute a specified course of action") are grouped under their  
13 associated enabling/direct means category. These capabilities are derived  
14 directly from the text descriptions found in this document. Numerical  
15 designators are assigned in the left-hand column for purposes of brevity.  
16

17 JOpsC Attributes: This section identifies where the Joint Operations Concepts  
18 (JOpsC) attributes are applicable to individual strategic deterrence capabilities.  
19 Per CJCSI 3170.01C, an attribute is "a testable or measurable characteristic  
20 that describes an aspect of a system or capability." The numerical designators  
21 indicate the capability being specified. Attributes are ordered left-to-right  
22 based on their relative applicability (*italic* number at bottom of column).  
23

24 SD Unique Attributes: Attributes unique to strategic deterrence are identified  
25 in this section. A given capability may have different attributes for deterrence  
26 and warfighting purposes. Again, the numerical designators indicate the  
27 specified capability. Attributes are ordered left-to-right based on their relative  
28 applicability (*italic* number at bottom of column).  
29

30 SD Unique Attribute Definitions: SD JOC-unique attribute definitions are  
31 included in this section.  
32

33 Functional Concept Impact: This section highlights the functional concepts  
34 specifically impacted (for strategic deterrence purposes) by each  
35 enabling/direct means category. For the Focused Logistics functional concept,  
36 this includes where the impact involves industrial base (vice operational  
37 employment) considerations.  
38

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**Section 1 - Means** and their associated capabilities ("the ability to . . .") for strategic deterrence

**Global Situational Awareness**

- The ability to conduct effective battlespace awareness of the spatial and temporal domains in support of national objectives
- The ability to conduct effective battlespace awareness of the adversary cognitive domain (strategic deterrence intelligence and assessment)
- The ability to identify and profile adversary senior leadership
- The ability to identify adversary value structures and high-value assets
- The ability to accomplish datamining on disparate government databases
- The ability to translate foreign language information in near-real time
- The ability to maintain robust targeting databases for planning purposes
- The ability to identify nature of/location/origin/ownership/support capabilities/employment source for WMD/E
- The ability to discriminate and surveil mobile targets of interest
- The ability to integrate C4ISR and C2 activity via networked operations

**Command and Control**

- The ability to conduct blue force tracking and status monitoring
- The ability to dynamically conference senior civilian leadership/CJCS/COCOMs/Service Chiefs/JFCs via electronic means
- The ability for senior U.S. leadership to directly communicate with fielded forces/initiate weapons employment with minimal intervening support
- The ability to conduct adaptable and flexible command and control from course of action development through selection and execution
- The ability to conduct enduring C2 activities across the range of military operations and threat environments (to include WMD/E) in support of senior national and military leadership

**Overseas Presence**

- The ability to maintain responsive forward stationed/forward deployed combat expeditionary forces

**Allied/coalition Military Cooperation & Integration**

- The ability to form responsive coalitions to counter adversary aims
- The ability to implement coalition actions to an equal degree of rapidity and unity of effort as compared to unilateral action

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**Force Projection**

- The ability to project U.S. military power globally
- The ability to conduct major combat operations across all operational domains
- The ability to defeat adversary anti-access strategies
- The ability to deny adversary sanctuary from U.S. attack ops
- The ability to conduct military operations subsequent to WMD/E employment
- The ability to limit adversary damage to U.S./allies/noncombatants
- The ability to rapidly position forces and focus efforts in areas of crisis or potential conflict

**Nuclear Strike Capabilities**

- The ability to destroy or neutralize adversary WMD/E
- The ability to destroy adversary leadership and command and control
- The ability to destroy adversary critical industries/resources/means of political organization & control
- The ability to destroy hard and deeply buried facilities
- The ability to target and destroy location uncertainty targets
- The ability to reconstitute nuclear weapons production and testing infrastructure
- The ability to achieve tailored weapons effects (limit collateral damage and/or enhance lethality)

**Active & Passive Defenses**

- The ability to maintain a robust Homeland Security posture
- The ability to conduct global ballistic missile defense
- The ability to conduct global cruise missile defense
- The ability to integrate active defenses with offensive counterforce operations
- The ability to reduce U.S. vulnerability to attack through passive defense measures
- The ability to prevent or seriously limit damage through passive defenses and CBRNE consequence management
- The ability to sustain critical infrastructure in face of adversary attacks
- The ability to disperse U.S. forces to decrease target concentrations
- The ability to ensure functions of critical joint force systems are survivable against WMD/E
- The ability to achieve interoperability and functional redundancy
- The ability to achieve information assurance and provide effective computer network defenses

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**Global Strike**

- The ability to conduct limited-duration, extended-range precision kinetic and non-kinetic attacks in support of national objectives
- The ability to defeat adversary anti-access strategies
- The ability to deny adversary sanctuary from U.S. attack ops
- The ability to integrate in-theater and global forces/capabilities
- The ability to plan & conduct independent operations with minimal outside support and/or redundancy
- The ability to support real-time weapons command/targeting/retargeting/disarm/disablement
- The ability to minimize collateral damage
- The ability to conduct simultaneous attacks against target classes/categories
- The ability to demonstrate Global Strike capabilities openly to friends and adversaries alike
- The ability to maintain covert Global Strike capabilities to assure allies and dissuade adversaries
- The ability to conduct effective computer network attack

**SD Information Operations**

- The ability to inform adversaries explicitly of U.S. national interests and intentions
- The ability to communicate U.S. confidence in our ability to limit damage to ourselves and our allies
- The ability to communicate to adversaries their vulnerability to U.S. attack
- The ability to provide adversaries with terms and conditions for compliance
- The ability to communicate with or persuade non-leadership adversary elites
- The ability to conduct one- and two-way multiparty communications with a flexible, changing target audience
- The ability to efficiently and effectively communicate in the adversary's native language
- The ability to maintain robust electronic warfare capabilities

**Inducement Operations**

- The ability to provide shared early warning of aerospace/WMD attack to both friends and adversaries as needed
- The ability to seamlessly create and modify ad hoc warning networks
- The ability to secure adversary WMD and accomplish denuclearization
- The ability to transport and deliver direct compensation or other support to individual adversaries as appropriate
- The ability to communicate U.S. restraint and intent when in pursuit of limited objectives
- The ability to provide safe passage of personnel and material

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**Space Control**

- The ability to provide assured U.S. access to space
- The ability to proliferate space, link, user, and terrestrial segments
- The ability to leverage low-cost production and miniaturization within space systems
- The ability to harden/disperse/camouflage ground segments
- The ability to provide robust space system electronic links
- The ability to provide unambiguous indications of deliberate attack/environmental failures/onboard anomalies for on-orbit satellites and associated C2
- The ability to maintain continuous whole-earth coverage from a space vantage point
- The ability to automate interfaces within disparate space system elements
- The ability to rapidly reconstitute on-orbit satellite capabilities
- The ability to provide production-line methods for satellite/launch vehicle/C2/user segments
- The ability to ensure dual-use compatibility for Global Strike and responsive spacelift capabilities
- The ability to integrate land/air/sea/space/information systems to achieve space situational awareness
- The ability to deceive/disrupt/deny/degrade/destroy adversary space systems or capabilities
- The ability to limit collateral damage to the space environment and/or third-party systems
- The ability to achieve reversible negation effects on space systems

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**Section 2 - JOpsC Attributes Crosswalk**

	<b>Networked</b>	<b>Decentralized</b>	<b>Adaptable</b>	<b>Decision Superiority</b>	<b>Fully Integrated</b>	<b>Expeditionary</b>	<b>Lethal</b>
<b>GSA</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	
2	X	X	X	X	X		X
3	X	X	X	X	X		X
4	X	X	X	X	X		X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8	X	X	X	X	X	X	
9	X	X	X	X	X	X	
10	X	X	X	X	X	X	
<b>C2</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	
<b>OP</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>AMC&amp;I</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

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	<b>Networked</b>	<b>Decentralized</b>	<b>Adaptable</b>	<b>Decision Superiority</b>	<b>Fully Integrated</b>	<b>Expeditionary</b>	<b>Lethal</b>
<b>FP</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
<b>NSC</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X		
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>A&amp;PD</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X		X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8	X	X	X	X	X	X	
9	X	X	X	X	X	X	
10	X	X	X	X	X	X	
11	X	X	X	X	X	X	

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	<b>Networked</b>	<b>Decentralized</b>	<b>Adaptable</b>	<b>Decision Superiority</b>	<b>Fully Integrated</b>	<b>Expeditionary</b>	<b>Lethal</b>
<b>GS</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	
5	X	X	X	X		X	
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
9	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
10	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
11	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>SDIO</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X		X
2	X	X	X	X	X		X
3	X	X	X	X	X		X
4	X	X	X	X	X		X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>IndOps</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	

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	<b>Networked</b>	<b>Decentralized</b>	<b>Adaptable</b>	<b>Decision Superiority</b>	<b>Fully Integrated</b>	<b>Expeditionary</b>	<b>Lethal</b>
<b>SC</b>							
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	
3	X	X	X	X	X		
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	
7	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8	X	X	X	X	X	X	
9	X	X	X	X	X	X	
10	X	X	X	X	X		
11	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
12	X	X	X	X	X	X	
13	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
14	X	X	X	X	X	X	
15	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	82	82	82	82	81	71	40

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<b>Section 3 - SD JOC Unique Attributes Crosswalk</b>											
	<b>Survivable</b>	<b>Timely</b>	<b>Reliable</b>	<b>Resilient</b>	<b>Unambiguous</b>	<b>Secure</b>	<b>Redundant</b>	<b>Persistent</b>	<b>CD Limiting</b>	<b>Kinetic</b>	<b>Non-kinetic</b>
<b>GSA</b>											
1	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			
2	X	X	X	X				X			
3	X	X	X					X			
4	X		X					X			
5	X	X	X					X	X		
6	X	X	X		X						
7	X	X		X		X	X	X			
8	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		
9	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
10	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
<b>C2</b>											
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
<b>OP</b>											
1					X						
<b>AMC&amp;I</b>											
1		X			X						
2		X		X	X						

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	<u>Survivable</u>	<u>Timely</u>	<u>Reliable</u>	<u>Resilient</u>	<u>Unambiguous</u>	<u>Secure</u>	<u>Redundant</u>	<u>Persistent</u>	<u>Limits CD</u>	<u>Kinetic</u>	<u>Non-kinetic</u>
<b>FP</b>											
1	X	X		X					X	X	X
2	X	X		X					X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X						X	X
4	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X
5	X			X				X		X	X
6	X		X								
7		X	X	X	X			X			
<b>NSC</b>											
1	X	X	X			X			X	X	
2	X	X	X			X					
3	X	X	X			X				X	
4	X	X	X			X			X	X	
5	X	X	X			X			X	X	
6	X	X	X								
7	X	X	X						X		
<b>A&amp;PD</b>											
1	X		X		X			X			
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
5	X		X	X	X		X	X			
6	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			
7	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			
8	X	X			X	X					
9	X		X	X	X		X				
10				X			X				
11		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

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	<u>Survivable</u>	<u>Timely</u>	<u>Reliable</u>	<u>Resilient</u>	<u>Unambiguous</u>	<u>Secure</u>	<u>Redundant</u>	<u>Persistent</u>	<u>Limits CD</u>	<u>Kinetic</u>	<u>Non-kinetic</u>
<b>GS</b>											
1	X	X	X		X	X			X	X	X
2		X	X							X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
4	X	X					X				
5		X	X			X					
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
7	X		X						X		
8	X	X	X						X	X	X
9	X		X		X						
10	X		X			X					
11	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
<b>SDIO</b>											
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
2	X	X	X	X	X		X				
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
7	X	X	X	X	X						
8	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X
<b>IndOps</b>											
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
3	X	X	X			X					
4	X	X	X		X	X				X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
6	X	X	X			X					

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	<u>Survivable</u>	<u>Timely</u>	<u>Reliable</u>	<u>Resilient</u>	<u>Unambiguous</u>	<u>Secure</u>	<u>Redundant</u>	<u>Persistent</u>	<u>Limits CD</u>	<u>Kinetic</u>	<u>Non-kinetic</u>
<b>SC</b>											
1	X	X	X				X	X			
2	X	X					X				
3	X			X			X				
4	X			X		X	X				
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
7	X							X			
8	X	X		X		X					
9	X	X		X	X		X				
10	X			X							
11	X										
12	X	X						X			
13	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X
14	X								X		
15	X	X	X	X		X		X	X		X
	74	64	62	49	43	42	40	30	20	18	15

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**Section 4 - SD JOC Unique Attribute Definitions**

**Collateral Damage-limiting** (new) - that which prevents (or reduces) secondary or unintended loss and harm

**Kinetic** (Webster's) - of (or relating to) the motion of material bodies and the forces and energy associated therewith

**Non-kinetic** (new) - the intrinsic quality of that which is not kinetic

**Persistent** (Webster's) - existing for a long (or longer than usual) time or continuously

**Redundant** (Webster's) - serving as a duplicate for preventing failure of an entire system upon failure of a single component

**Reliable** (Webster's modified) - giving the same result on successive trials (or uses) of a system, procedure, or process.

**Resilient** (Webster's) - tending to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change

**Secure** (Webster's modified) - free from risk of loss (or intrusion) and affording safety; inviolable

**Survivable** (Webster's modified) - resulting in or permitting the continuation of existence and function

**Timely** (Webster's modified) - coming early or at the right moment as applied within a specific operational context

**Unambiguous** (Webster's modified) - clear and precise; not subject to misinterpretation

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**Section 5 - Functional Concept Impacts**

<b>JFCs</b> <b>CAPABILITIES</b>	<b>Protection</b>	<b>Joint Cmd and Control</b>	<b>Battlespace Awareness</b>	<b>Force Application</b>	<b>Focused Logistics</b>	<b>Focused Logistics (Industrial Base Issues)</b>
<b>Global Situational Awareness</b>	X		X		X	
<b>Command and Control</b>	X	X				
<b>Overseas Presence</b>			X	X	X	
<b>Allied/coalition Military Coop &amp; Integration</b>		X		X	X	
<b>Force Projection</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Nuclear Strike Capabilities</b>	X	X		X		X
<b>Active and Passive Defenses</b>	X	X	X	X		X
<b>Global Strike</b>		X	X	X		X
<b>Strategic Deterrence Information Ops</b>	X	X	X	X		
<b>Inducement Ops</b>	X	X	X			
<b>Space Control</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X

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